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Abstract
Micro-founded de-centralized financial intermediation in a cash and costly-credit
model(see Gillman and Kejak, 2008) results in a cost-distortion of returns implying
a lower average nominal and real risk-free rate when compared to standard cash-
in-advance RBC models. Failure of both short-run and long-run Fisher equation
relationships based on observable real and nominal rates and inflation are obtained.
The cost-distortion also leads to an unconditionally upward-sloping average yield
curve of interest rates which is also convex in shape. The model is capable of pro-
ducing a positive correlation between the nominal rate and velocity, and a negative
correlation between the ex-post real rate and inflation. More importantly, the model
also predicts a negative correlation between the ex-ante real rate and the ex-ante ex-
pected rate of inflation. Finally, the conditional spread between the usual CCAPM
rate as defined by Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and the model-implied money mar-
ket rate is positively correlated with the stance of monetary policy, offering a new
perspective on this systematic link recently studied empirically by Canzoneri et al.
(2007a) and theoretically by Canzoneri and Diba (2005).
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1 Introduction
Ever since the development of the consumption-based general equilibrium ver-
sion of the CAPM model (Merton, 1971; Breeden, 1979; Lucas, 1978), the ma-
jority of contributions to the literature studying asset prices within this frame-
work have focused on determining ex-ante expected asset returns in terms of
risk premia derived from undiversifiable systematic risk. This approach of
studying risk premia implied by the covariance of an asset’s return with a
typically preference-based stochastic discount factor (SDF) - or alternatively,
the beta representation involving a correlation coefficient times a unique mar-
ket price of risk 1 - has established itself as the standard way of studying asset
prices in general equilibrium, not exclusively due to, but also because of the
striking resemblance to earlier approaches in finance, most notably the stan-
dard CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1969) of pricing assets, which instead of
using some consumption-related measure, typically uses the market-portfolio’s
return as a way of proxying current marginal value of wealth.
In spite of the relative success of general equilibrium models in explaining
the behaviour of aggregate quantities, it has proven immensely difficult to
accomplish the same regarding asset prices, where any such failure of match-
ing up theory with financial data stylized facts has typically been labelled
a ”puzzle”. Two of such puzzles are the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott, 1985) and the closely related risk-free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989), on
the one hand, and the term premium puzzle (Backus et al., 1989; Donaldson
et al., 1990), on the other. Whereas the equity premium puzzle documents the
quantitative failure of the consumption beta model to explain the observed ex-
cess return risky stocks earn over the risk-free rate, the low risk-free rate puzzle
asks why, given a historical long-term annual growth rate of consumption in
U.S. data of roughly 2%, the observed historical average real risk-free rate has
been only approximately 1%. In a recent empirical study based on various
utility specifications and using data on consumption and inflation, Canzoneri
et al. (2007a) compare the theory-implied (i.e. consumption Euler equation-
implied) CCAPM rates with the observed ex-post money market rates, only
to find that they typically bear little resemblance conditionally and that they
exhibit a positive spread unconditionally, the low risk-free rate again. They
also find that the spread between the two rates is directly related to the stance
of monetary policy. Kocherlakota (1996) emphasises how the low-risk free rate
can really be viewed as a puzzle arising from the tension which emerges from
explaining the two phenomena of the low risk-free and the high equity returns
simultaneously. Also, in contrast to much of literature’s recent emphasis placed
1 Using Cochrane’s notation, p = E(mx) can always be expressed as E(Ri) =
Rf +
(
cov(Ri,m)
var(m)
)(
var(m)
E(m)
)
which is just E(Ri) = Rf + βi,mλm, the beta represen-
tation (Cochrane, 2005)
2
on unconditional excess returns typically derived from first-order conditions
using log-normal distributional assumptions about returns, Giovannini and
Labadie (1991) show how in dynamic simulations of theoretical ex-ante bond
and stock returns obtained from a monetary endowment economy with stan-
dard power utility, both rates move conditionally almost in identical fashion
together, leading to the striking result that only fluctuations in the SDF (or
equivalently the marginal utility of wealth) represent the underlying common
factor driving movements in both rates, whereas conditional movements of
risk premia appear to play little or no significance in this regard, the equity
premium puzzle again. There now exists a sizeable literature trying to explain
the high equity premium, whose review would be beyond the scope of this
paper. A recent and very comprehensive survey of the equity premium liter-
ature is provided by Mehra and Prescott (2003). Other good discussions of
the equity premium are also contained in Cochrane (2007), Cochrane (2005)
and Campbell (2000).
The term premium puzzle, on the other hand, pertains to the unconditional
yield curve of government-issued bonds, which in post-war U.S. data is upward-
sloping, both for the real 2 and the nominal yield curve (see Fama, 1990; den
Haan, 1995). What is also of importance is that the unconditional yield curve
is typically much steeper at the short- than the long-end, so it is also highly
convex on average 3 . In contrast to this, bond yields derived from standard
general equilibrium models obey a generalised, risk-adjusted version of the
pure expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates (see Backus
et al., 1989; Donaldson et al., 1990; den Haan, 1995). Risk-neutral investors
or deterministic settings imply a completely flat yield curve ”on average”,
risk-averse agents facing uncertainty and a positively autocorrelated process
for the stochastic discount factor, imply an unconditionally downward-sloping
yield curve. Within the latter set of assumptions, Backus et al. (1989) also
show that an independently evolving stochastic discount factor also implies a
flat yield curve on average. Typically, general equilibrium as well as atheoreti-
cal “affine” one-factor models approximate the nominal yield curve by simply
modeling it’s real counterpart, in order to make valuation of yields tractable
and to avoid theoretical concerns over how money demand ought to be moti-
vated on theoretical grounds. Labadie (1994) and den Haan (1995) also show
2 Using evidence from UK inflation-indexed bonds, Seppala (2000) recently argued
that the real term structure for the UK is downward-sloping, so he asserts the stan-
dard RBC model’s predictions are correct. However, in a series of studies, Mishkin
(1982, 1990b,a, 1992) found that real and nominal interest rates move in tandem,
contradicting this view.
3 Campbell et al. (1997), using the McCulloch and Kwon (1993) U.S term structure
data base, find an average spread of the 10-year zero-coupon log yield over the
one-month TB yields of 137 basis points. Also, the average yield spread over the
one-month TB is 33 BP at three months, 77 BP at one year and 96 BP at two years.
There is very little further change in average yields after two years.
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that care needs to be taken in specifying the endowment process in levels
in a simple Lucas exchange economy. Difference-stationary specifications lead
to small persistence in expected consumption growth and positively autocor-
related consumption growth (leading to the counterfactual downward-sloping
term structure on average), whereas trend-stationary specification leads to the
opposite (an upward-sloping term structure on average, but with a counter-
factual dynamic behaviour of the SDF using power utility 4 ). Also, regardless
what type of autocorrelation for the SDF is either assumed or endogenously
obtained from within a model, for standard power utility with low risk aver-
sion, the slope would be relatively constant and thus not exhibit the stronger
curvature effects at the short end seen in the data 5 , as well as quantitatively
small thus in an approximate sense leading to a practically flat yield curve
unconditionally 6 . Related to this last point, Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)
argue that the observed slope of the term structure must imply high volatility
of the stochastic discount factor due to high Sharpe ratios in the bond market
which result from small average bond term premia coupled with low term pre-
mia volatility. However, Campbell (2000) points out that ”high Sharpe ratios
of this sort [...] are of course highly sensitive to transactions costs or liquidity
services [emph. added] provided by Treasury bills”.
A large majority of explanations put forth in an attempt to resolve the equity
premium or term premium puzzle are typically derived from simple endow-
ment economies, in which output is perishable and governed by an exogenously
specified process, thus through market clearing also determining the level of
consumption in each period. The habit persistence literature (see Constan-
tinides, 1990; Abel, 1990) has been a particular focus of attention, as habit
persistence in consumption can potentially alter the stochastic discount factor
in ways to induce more volatility in marginal utility, and thus lower the degree
of risk-aversion required to obtain sufficiently large risk premia. Equally, other
utility function specifications, such as Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and
Zin, 1991) have also been explored, as they allow disentangling of the elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution from the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
However, as recently emphasised by Cochrane (2007) and Mehra and Prescott
(2003), the current state of affairs is such that none of the contributions made
4 However, if the discount factor is equal to some power of expected consumption
growth, both Donaldson et al. (1990) and den Haan (1995) discuss how observed con-
sumption growth can be either positive or negative, depending on whether quarterly
or monthly consumption data is analysed, thus raising concerns over aggregation
bias.
5 This is a typical feature of simple one-factor affine term structure models to which
standard general equilibrium models with power utility typically reduce to. Backus
et al. (1998) provide a good survey of discrete-time term structure models demon-
strating the lack of convexity in one-factor models.
6 This fact is also emphasised by (Bansal and Coleman, 1996, p.1148) who also call
the theoretical term structure in standard models “essentially flat”.
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hitherto have reduced macro-finance’s reliance on assumptions of fairly large
levels of risk aversion in order to explain the equity premium, whereas a broad
consensus view on the parameter of relative risk-aversion appears to place this
value at a plausible maximum of five, and perhaps closer to one, i.e. logarith-
mic specification (see Kocherlakota, 1996, p.52). Indeed, to draw an analogy
to another popular literature, just as research in the New Keynesian literature
for a period of time has asked ”How much rigidity [in price and wage contracts]
do we need?”, apparently the general equilibrium asset pricing literature has
and still remains asking itself ”How much risk-aversion do we need?”
Assuming sufficiently high levels of risk-aversion and adopting new utility
functions has resulted in some degree of success in explaining stylized asset
pricing facts from within endowment economies. However, regarding both the
equity premium and the term premium, den Haan (1995) and Jermann (1998)
demonstrate how fully specified general equilibrium models with non-trivial
production and a physical capital storage technology (in which consumption
and dividends are endogenously determined), allow the representative agent
to more successfully implement her consumption smoothing objective (i.e. al-
lowing consumption to react endogenously in order to smooth the volatility
in the marginal value of wealth), thus eliminating many positive results ob-
tained from simple endowment economies, in particular such which have been
obtained in combination with habit persistence. In fact, Jermann (1998) is
only able to preserve a sufficiently large equity premium by reducing physical
capital’s effectivity as a storage technology by introducing adjustment costs
to investment (and thus making the supply of physical capital inelastic) in
addition to incorporating habit persistence in consumption. Similarly, Boldrin
et al. (2001) also combine habit formation with real rigidities in the productive
sector, by adding a capital-goods production sector with decreasing returns
(leading to an inelastic supply of capital that way) and disallowing labour to
react to current-period shocks.
One problem which is shared by both of the aforementioned production-
economy based explanations of the equity premium (and indeed in general
with other models using habit persistence in consumption), is that the in-
creased volatility in the marginal value of wealth, which stems from the non-
seperable nature of such utility specifications, also raises the volatility of real
interest rates to implausibly high levels and as a result also alters the be-
haviour of aggregate quantities in non-trivial ways. 7 . Tallarini (2000) modifies
an environment similar to the production general equilibrium model studied
7 Within an endowment economy framework, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) have
recently proposed a solution to the interest rate volatility problem, by specifying a
nonlinear habit utility function, in which the ”intertemporal substitution” effect -
which is the culprit for implausibly high variation in interest rates - is just offset by
a ”precautionary savings” effect.
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by Jermann to include Epstein and Zin non-expected utility. Although he can-
not account for the equity premium, he improves on the risk-free rate puzzle
and the market price of risk (or equivalently, the Sharpe ratio). But the main
result of his paper is to show that there is a real possibility to modify simple
general equilibrium models such as to improve asset pricing predictions, leav-
ing aggregate quantity dynamics practically unaltered, something which could
not be said for Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001) 8 .
The present paper follows the tradition of the above-mentioned literature on
asset pricing within fully specified production economies, embodied by Jer-
mann (1998); Boldrin et al. (2001); Tallarini (2000), whose focus is primarily
on ”second-order” risk-induced arguments related to undiversifiable system-
atic risk, and McCallum and Goodfriend (2007); Canzoneri and Diba (2005);
Canzoneri et al. (2008), whose focus is instead on ”first-order” certainty-
equivalent arguments typically related to implicit liquidity returns of short-
term debt. Building on previous work by Gillman and Kejak (2008) and Benk
et al. (2005), this paper develops, calibrates and dynamically analyses a mon-
etary general equilibrium model, which is essentially of cash-in-advance type,
but is modified by the addition of a de-centralised micro-founded banking
sector, whose credit production specification is motivated by the financial in-
termediation literature (Clark, 1984; Hancock, 1985).
The banking sector acts as a financial intermediary, using labour and deposits
to produce a credit service which can be used in conjunction with money to
pay for the consumption good. Further, the bank is also holding government
debt of all maturities, which are translated one-for-one into equivalent bond-
backed saving deposits of various maturity held in turn by the representative
household. Closely resembling an argument related to the liquidity-providing
role of short-term government debt developed by Bansal and Coleman (1996),
credit is assumed to be produced subject to a collateral requirement, meaning
that a share of the economy-wide supply of short-term (nominally) riskless
nominal debt is retained on the banking sector’s balance sheet in order to
back up the aggregate amount of credit produced.
In contrast to Bansal and Coleman, the banking sector’s payout on it’s col-
lateral is re-distributed back to the household in form of a dividend payment
equal in value to the total cost of using credit. Instead, the total payout 9
on the credit-backing collateral share of economy-wide short-term debt (and
thus the total payout on the equivalent share of the one-period saving deposit)
is replaced by the total revenue from credit production minus the banking
8 However, (Cochrane, 2007, p. 297 ) argues against the possibility of ever obtaining
a pure ”separation theorem” of quantity and price dynamics.
9 A discussion of the ”total payout” on (a share) of debt is possible in this model, as
short-term debt is assumed, as in Bansal and Coleman (1996) to be in net positive
supply.
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wage bill, which upon normalising by credit (or equivalently by the share of
economy-wide short-term debt equal in value to credit) implies a return on
that share equal to the price (or average revenue) of credit minus the average
product (or average cost) paid out to the consumer in form of the credit-
normalised banking wage bill. The lower than usual residual return on the
collateral share of debt which equals the per-credit normalised revenue share
of deposits in credit production constitutes a no-arbitrage equilibrium vis-a-
vis the higher (nominal) return on capital represented by the CCAPM rate
as defined in Canzoneri and Diba (2005), as the household is compensated in
form of the banking wage bill equal to that difference.
The model presented here thus offers a micro-founded financial intermedia-
tion approach, driving a cost-wedge derived from liquidity (credit) production
between the CCAPM and the money market rate, which is in contrast to Can-
zoneri and Diba (2005), who obtain a similar return wedge by placing (a func-
tion of) bonds in an ad-hoc way directly into the cash-in-advance constraint,
and McCallum and Goodfriend (2007), by specifying a loan-management func-
tion, in which bonds are more effective as collateral vis-a-vis physical capital,
obtaining the interest rate wedge that way. Also, McCallum and Goodfriend
(2007) cannot account for variations in velocity, since in their model loans
and the monetary base (i.e. two distinct ”high-powered” exchange bases) are
lumped together through the financial accelerator framework (see Bernanke
et al., 1999) to give a measure for broad money entering the cash-in-advance
constraint as the only effective means of exchange. In contrast, the model
presented here is capable of exhibiting endogenous variation in velocity, as
a unique exchange equilibrium between money and produced credit is ob-
tained through diminishing returns to labour only in the credit sector and
the resulting intersection between the cost of holding money and a convex
upward-sloping marginal cost schedule in credit production (see Gillman and
Kejak, 2008).
Through the key mechanism described above, the model is qualitatively capa-
ble of simultaneously explaining the low risk-free rate, the high equity premium
and a term structure which is on average upward-sloping and convex in shape.
Novel asset pricing results are obtained by distorting deterministic mean re-
turns directly in a certainty-equivalent framework sense through endogenous
cost-driven effects of the banking sector, rather than through the usual risk-
induced variations of ex-ante returns, related to the undiversifiability of sys-
tematic risk. However, as I will discuss further below, ”first-order” certainty-
equivalent “market-driven” asset price distortions (such as those in Bansal
and Coleman (1996), Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and Canzoneri et al. (2008)
and the model presented here) can potentially be combined trivially with
second-order risk-induced asset price distortions stemming from undiversifi-
able systematic risk, as long as the former distort returns (or prices) of traded
assets such as to be visibly different in equilibrium from the usual CCAPM
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rates in ways which are directly compensated (or hedged) elsewhere, leading
to distortions which do not constitute undiversifiable systematic risk but are
completely hedged by construction 10 .
The model improves on Bansal and Coleman (1996) along two dimensions.
First, the model’s results are more transparently driven by the distortive effects
of a micro-founded banking sector, instead of appealing to an essentially ad-
hoc transactions-cost function (McCallum, 1983). Secondly, combined with the
usual expectations hypothesis of the term structure present in such models, the
term structure results do no require multi-period bonds to provide liquidity
services and - directly related to this last point - the model is capable of
explaining a term structure which is steeper at the short-end than the long-
end. Further, simulations reveal a positive correlation between the nominal
rate and velocity and a negative correlation between the ex-post real risk-
free rate and inflation. Finally, in line with recent theoretical (Canzoneri and
Diba, 2005; Canzoneri et al., 2007b) and empirical (Canzoneri et al., 2007a)
evidence of a systematic link between monetary policy and the spread between
a theory-implied CCAPM and the observed ex-post money market rate 11 , the
model is capable of linking monetary tightening to a fall in this spread and
vice-versa.
In order to permit a direct comparison with Bansal and Coleman (1996), I
present theoretical asset pricing results using two different modeling frame-
works, one which follows Canzoneri et al. (2008) in which the nominal CCAPM
rate of interest is in the usual way endogenously determined through the stan-
dard Fisher relationship and the money supply process is exogenously speci-
fied, and Bansal & Coleman’s modeling technique, in which the nominal rate
of interest is assumed to be an essentially fixed state-contingent government
target (or alternatively, exogenously specified process) and the money supply
process is, for a given endogenous real rate of interest determined from the
model, endogenously implied through the Fisher equation. Using the latter
approach, I show how the credit-banking model presented here is capable of
producing asset pricing results which are functionally equivalent to those in
Bansal & Coleman, and in particular how this permits simultaneously lowering
the risk-free rate and raising the equity premium.
I show how the cost-driven distortive effects of the banking sector are es-
10 The model presented here satisfies this condition, as endogenous cost-driven vari-
ations of the low risk-free rate are always perfectly hedged by equivalent compen-
sating variations in the banking wage bill. Related to this, Coeurdacier et al. (2007)
explain the equity home bias puzzle through the hedging function of the domestic
goods production wage bill, when households face re-distributive shocks.
11 In similar fashion to Canzoneri and Diba (2005), the model explains this spread
by providing a theoretical framework in which both the CCAPM and the money
market rates (and thus their spread) are determined from within a model.
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sentially driven by a partitioning of the return on a fraction of short-term
debt into a lower than usual risk-free rate and a compensating payout in
form of the banking wage bill paid out to the representative household, which
constitutes a no-arbitrage position vis-a-vis the standard CCAPM return, as
the former two always add up to the latter. Further, I argue that standard
uncertainty-induced risk premia results (typically embodied by covariances of
the stochastic discount factor and the cash flow of an asset in terms of the
consumption good) stemming from the undiversifiability of systematic risk in
stochastic environments are preserved, since the only additional uncertainty
the representative household faces is the ex-ante ignorance over how much of
the return he receives will be in form of his short-term saving deposit and how
much residually in form of the banking wage bill. Since the two always add
up to the standard CCAPM rates (both real and nominal), this type of re-
turn uncertainty is not of systematic risk type and in fact perfectly hedged or
insured and thus will not upset standard stochastic ex-ante effective returns,
once the return in form of the banking wage bill is added back towards the
visibly lower return on the short-term saving deposit.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the
setup of the model which is populated by a household, a firm and and a credit-
banking sector. Section 3 discusses how the model is capable of altering asset
pricing results obtained from standard (monetary) real business cycle models.
A direct comparison with Bansal and Coleman (1996) is presented and in par-
ticular, the model’s stochastic asset pricing implications are discussed using
Bansal&Coleman’s modeling technique. In preparation for dynamic analysis
of the first-order approximate solution of the model contained in section 5, sec-
tion 4 studies the steady state properties of the model in it’s entirety, instead
of exclusively focusing on asset pricing results. In similar spirit to Canzoneri
et al. (2008), the dynamic analysis in the section thereafter focuses on impulse
responses as well as correlations obtained from simulations of the model solved
for it’s recursive law of motion. Section 6 provides a discussion of the results
and finally, section 7 concludes.
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2 The economic environment
In what follows I am going to write down an essentially standard cash-in-
advance real business cycle model (Lucas, 1982; Stokey and Lucas, 1987),
which is only modified by adding a further means-of-exchange, credit, which
is costly produced by a decentralised financial intermediary (FI) by use of
a two factor CRS Cobb-Douglas production function, whose specification is
motivated by the financial intermediation literature (see Clark, 1984; Hancock,
1985). Following Gillman and Kejak (2008), deposits are created from the total
exchange liquidity used in the model for carrying out consumption both in
terms of money and credit, which means that consumption and (real) deposits
can be used interchangeably:
ct ≡ dt (1)
Further, in line with Canzoneri and Diba (2005) 12 , I will refer to the standard
derivations of prices for real and nominal bonds as (where my derivations
assume a constant rate of economic growth equal to γ):
pb,N1,t = Et
[
βλt+1
γλt (1 + πt+1)
]
= mt+1t,N (2)
and
pb1,t = Et
[
βλt+1
γλt
]
= mt+1t (3)
as the CCAPM prices of short-term nominal and real bonds, respectively. mt+1t,N
and mt+1t , on the other hand, are the the corresponding one-period nominal
and real CCAPM stochastic discount factors from period t to t + 1. Notice
also, that the above expressions can also be expressed in terms of CCAPM
real returns on nominal and real bonds, where the real return on the real bond
is simply the inverse of the real discount factor:
1 + r1,t =
[
Et
(
βλt+1
γλt
)]
−1
(4)
12 They only define CCAPM returns, but returns can of course always alternatively
be expressed in terms of prices as well.
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and the real-valued return on the nominal bond, given by 1 + ir1,t, is defined
as:
1 + ir1,t = (1 + i1,t)Et
[
(1 + πt+1)
−1
]
= (1 + r1,t)− (1 + i1,t)
Cov
(
λt
λt+1
, (1 + πt+1)
−1
)
Et
(
λt
λt+1
) (5)
where the covariance term reflects the inflation risk-premium driving a wedge
between the pure Fisher equation relationship (see Giovannini and Labadie,
1991). Notice that it may sometimes be convenient in analytical computa-
tions to set this covariance between the expected marginal value of wealth
and inflation equal to zero, so that for given inflation expectations, modeling
of nominal rates of returns can be approximated by modelling real counter-
parts 13 . Refering to the above standard concepts in this explicit fashion is
necessary, as the present model will provide an alternative definition for the
equivalent risk-free real and nominal price for bonds, given by:
p˜b1,t = m˜
t+1
t (6)
and
p˜b,N1,t = m˜
t+1
t,N (7)
respectively, which will generally differ from the standard definitions given
above. The derivation of these distorted short-term real and nominal discount
factors (and their corresponding rates) and analysis of their endogenous be-
haviour with respect to various factors, such as monetary policy, is the key con-
tribution of this paper. Further, in order to aid derivations of the CCAPM (or
purely intertemporal) rates, the household’s budget constraint will also con-
tain net balances of one-period nominal virtual bonds, which are not thought
to be traded in reality and correspond to the usual nominal bonds in standard
cash-in-advance models in which the absence of an FI eliminates distortions to
the analogous risk-free payout on the corresponding short-term saving deposit.
The net balances of these virtual nominal short-term bonds as they appear on
the consumer’s budget constraint are given by:
(1 + it−1)
(1 + πt)
b∗t−1 − b
∗
t (8)
In similar fashion to Bansal and Coleman (1996), I assume that the financial
intermediary needs to retain a share of the short-term government debt equal
in value to credit as collateral on it’s balance sheet. Instead of paying out
13 see Gibbons and Ramaswamy (1993) for an application of this assumption in the
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of the term structure.
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the usual return on that share (i.e. the net nominal CCAPM rate), the FI re-
distributes the earnings on it’s collateral back to the representative household
in form of a dividend equal in value to the original cost of purchasing the credit
service. However, as I will show, the representative household still obtains the
same effective return on the short-term saving deposit, as it would in an
undistorted cash-in-advance model. However, since part of this return is re-
distributed back in form of the banking wage bill, the visibly obtained residual
return on the short-term saving deposit will reflect this cost and thus be lower.
It is this arrangement which leads to the result of a lower than usual risk-
free rate (and a convex upward-sloping average term structure), which I will
discuss in more detail further below. The model is set up such as to allow only
trade in nominally-denominated government debt, however shadow prices and
returns of inflation-indexed bonds can of course be derived in the usual way.
Before specifying the various sectors characterising the economic environment,
I will first discuss how short-term debt is modeled to be in positive net supply,
in terms of a government-targeted debt ratio, similar to Bansal and Coleman
(1996) and Canzoneri et al. (2008) 14 .
2.1 Modeling the supply of short-term debt
The results derived below require short-term government debt to be modeled
in positive net supply, as a share of the short-term government bond will affect
asset pricing results in the economy. Here, I will briefly discuss my strategy of
doing so, which employs the idea of a proportional supply of short-term debt,
relative to deposits. Therefore, I define the variable:
η˜t−1 =
b˜1,t−1/ (1 + πt)
dt
(9)
to be the pre-transfer beginning-of-period proportional amount of debt, rel-
ative to real deposits, before any fiscal government adjustment has taken
place and b˜1,t−1 as the corresponding pre-transfer pre-determined beginning-
of-period amount of short-term (one-period) government nominal debt (in
terms of beginning-of-period prices). As will be shown, the model’s results
are derived from some notion of how a share of this proportional debt will
be retained by the FI and issued instead as a dividend payment on retained
collateral. Since credit in the model is an endogenously determined variable,
the share of retained government debt is also endogenously determined. In
order to keep the analysis tractable and the intuition simple, my strategy will
be to keep the supply of proportional debt fixed in all time periods.
14 The former specify an exogenous process for the value of total bond issue, the
latter also work with debt ratios.
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Notice though that debt is pre-determined at the beginning of the period t−1,
but deposits (or consumption) and inflation are endogenously determined from
within the model at the end of the period t. In order to keep the proportional
supply of debt fixed in all time periods, the following timing convention will
hold. After the revelation of all shocks and the resolution of uncertainty, the
government can move first and, knowing the full structure of the economy
(and thus the outcome of the competitive equilibrium prices and quantities),
and thus also the level of end-of-period deposits and the level of inflation,
uses fiscal transfers to adjust the level of pre-determined debt such as to
perfectly obtain a fixed debt-to-consumption ratio. After that all other agents
in the economy move and the competitive equilibrium is obtained. This timing
convention amounts to the following specification of the proportional supply
of short-term government debt:
ηt−1 = η¯ =
b1,t−1/ (1 + πt)
dt
(10)
where b1,t−1 is the corresponding beginning-of-period amount of short-term
debt after the fiscal adjustment to keep in line with the endogenously de-
termined level of deposits and inflation has taken place 15 . This simplifying
assumption allows me to focus only on the way a share of this fixed propor-
tional supply of debt influences relevant results in the model. In particular,
as I will show below, the share of consumption paid for in credit - where the
absolute level of credit is given by ft and the corresponding share by f
∗
t - is a
well-defined (production) function bounded between [0, 1] and is defined as:
f ∗t =
ft
dt
(11)
Therefore, as long as the government incurs sufficient short-term proportional
(relative to deposits) liabilities relative to the proportional (relative to deposits
as well) production of credit 16 , i.e
η¯ =
b1,t−1/ (1 + πt)
dt
>
ft
dt
(12)
for fixed η¯ it is then always possible to define a share sbt , which as long as
the above fiscal liability condition holds is bounded between [0, 1] and defines
the proportional production of credit relative to the proportional amount of
short-term debt. Because the proportionality factor is given by deposits for
both supply of debt and production of credit, sbt defines the proportion of
15 The main idea here is to adjust the absolute size of debt before agents trade, so
that after they willingly hold the debt, they still incur the end-of-period erosion
through inflation.
16 Canzoneri et al. (2008) also require sufficient debt to be issued relative to demand
in order for an equilibrium to be attained, see footnote 11 in their paper.
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credit relative to debt directly, i.e.
sbt =
f ∗t
η
=
ft/dt
b1,t−1
1+πt
/dt
=
ft
b1,t−1/ (1 + πt)
(13)
Notice that sbt represents the share of short-term debt which is retained by
the financial intermediary as collateral for credit, and I may sometimes wish
to refer to it as the debt utilisation rate due to credit production or simply
the banking sector’s debt utilisation rate. Next, I will discuss the optimisation
problem of the financial intermediary, which acts on behalf of the represen-
tative household and thus discounts current and future items on it’s balance
sheet using the household’s stochastic discount rate.
2.2 The financial intermediary
The financial intermediary acts in a decentralised fashion as a producer of
the credit exchange service demanded by the representative household and
is also assumed to be profit maximising, sharing the economy-wide discount
factor, given by β
kλt+k
λt
. It produces credit using a CRS technology in labour
and deposits created by the household, which is given by:
ft = e
vtAf (κt−1nf,t)
ρ (dt)
1−ρ (14)
where κt is a labour-augmenting exogenously specified parameter evolving
according to:
κt = γκt−1 (15)
thus determining the exogenously specified growth rate of the economy. Notice
that it will often be convenient to express the credit-production function as
a deposit- (or consumption-) normalised equivalent credit-share production
function, which exhibits decreasing returns in deposit-normalised augmented
labour and is given by:
f ∗t =
ft
dt
= evtAf
(
κt−1nf,t
dt
)ρ
(16)
Notice that this specification - assuming appropriately parametrised values for
ρ, implies a convex marginal cost schedule in credit production (see Benk et al.,
2005; Gillman and Kejak, 2008), which given a certain price of credit (which
will turn out to be the net nominal CCAPM rate) leads to a unique exchange
equilibrium between money and credit. Further, in a stochastic environment
with shocks to credit productivity (and thus to credit production’s marginal
cost schedule) and shocks leading to variation in the (net) nominal CCAPM
rate of interest, the economy will exhibit variation in (money-consumption)
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velocity, which will be positively correlated with the nominal CCAPM rate
(or the price of credit). The FI is assumed to be the conduit for all liquidity
supplied to the consumer. Besides providing the produced credit, the FI is also
assumed to carry out optimal portfolio decisions on behalf and as instructed
by the representative household. This means that the FI holds beginning-
of-period money balances and receives instructions over how much much of
current wealth be used to acquire end-of-period money balances, i.e.
mt−1
(1 + πt)
−mt (17)
where mt represent end-of-period t real money balances. Government taxes
or transfers are not modeled explicitly. However, given the government’s en-
dogenously determined fiscal policy to hit the fixed debt-to-deposit ratio and
the corresponding interest payment obligations, appropriate helicopter-money
lump-sum taxation can always be chosen independently in state-contingent
fashion such as to implement a steady state money growth rate Θ∗ with some
random component embodied by the shock parameter ut. The stochastic nom-
inal money growth rate is thus given by
Θt = (Mt/Mt−1 − 1) = (Θ
∗ + eut − 1) (18)
where Θt is the growth rate of money and Θ
∗ is it’s stationary counterpart.
Since the economy is growing at the steady state growth rate γ, in order
to obtain a particular steady state target level of inflation, the monetary
authority has to set the growth rate of money above the exogenous economic
level of growth by that inflation target, so in steady state:
1 + π =
1 + Θ∗
γ
(19)
which for a positive steady state target inflation rate (1 + π) > 1 implies
setting 1 +Θ∗ > γ. The money balances on the bank’s balance sheet are part
of it’s liabilities, as the representative household (frictionlessly) sources money
balances from ATMmachines with equivalent electronic balances (which are in
turn linked to non-interest paying current account balances appearing on the
representative household’s budget constraint). These ATM electronic balances
are sourced from current accounts (Dct ) and therefore appear on the bank’s
balance sheet as follows:
−
dct−1
(1 + πt)
+ dct (20)
where the bank’s liquidity restriction given by mt = d
c
t ∀t implies:
mt−1
(1 + πt)
−mt −
dct−1
(1 + πt)
+ dct = 0 (21)
15
where dct are current-period current account balances in terms of the con-
sumption good, from which withdrawals from ATM machines are sourced.
Moreover, The FI is also the holder of nominal government debt balances of
all maturity, which as I will show will translate into one-for-one nominal bal-
ances of equivalent saving accounts, which will be part of the representative
household’s budget constraint. The receipts of government nominal debt bal-
ances net of new purchases will therefore appear in the FI’s balance sheet as
follows:
1 + i1,t−1
(1 + πt)
b1,t−1 +
n∑
j=2
1 + ij,t−1
(1 + ij−1,t) (1 + πt)
bj,t−1 − b1,t −
n∑
j=2
bj,t (22)
Notice that the FI willingly holds all government debt on behalf of the rep-
resentative household at prices implied by the (nominal) stochastic discount
factor consistent with the one from the representative household. Instead of
viewing the FI as the portfolio optimiser acting on behalf of the representative
agent one may also view the FI as the channel through which the government
“floats” it’s debt structure, thus commissioning the FI to convert bond hold-
ings into equivalent saving deposits held in turn by the representative house-
hold. From this perspective, and as a specific example only focusing on the
one-period nominal short-term debt (which is modeled in net positive supply),
the FI has an obligation to the monetary authority (or the government), to
float all of the supply and to pay the interest as implied by the equilibrium
nominal stochastic discount factor. This perspective will be relevant in further
discussions related to the derivation of the risk-free (nominal and real) rate.
Finally, closely resembling a liquidity argument originally developed by Bansal
and Coleman (1996), credit balances, given by ft have to be backed up by a
retained share of the short-term government debt equal to that value on it’s
balance sheet, which will serve as collateral for credit and will be defined as
Ωct . Since the collateral has to be retained by the FI, the net CCAPM return
on this collateral multiplied by the amount of collateral (equal to credit) is re-
distributed back to the representative household as a dividend payment from
the financial intermediary. This implies:
ft = s
b
t
b1,t−1
(1 + πt)
≡ Ωct (23)
where Ωct is the collateral. This implies for the re-distributed dividend Π
f
t :
Πft = Ω
c
tit−1 = Ω
c
t
(
µt
λt
)
= ft
(
µt
λt
)
= ftp
f
t (24)
Where the last equality emphasises the fact that the cost of credit is re-
distributed back to the household in lump-sum fashion in form of a dividend
payment from the FI. Notice also that equation (23) can alternatively be
expressed in terms of proportions (relative to deposits) and then solved for
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the share variable, sbt :
sbt =
ft/dt
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
/dt
=
f ∗t
η¯
(25)
which emphasises the endogenous determination of this share and how this af-
fects the (proportional) share of short-term government debt which is retained
by the FI on it’s balance sheet and whose payout is finally re-distributed in
terms dividend payment. Of course the discussion thus far then begs the ques-
tion: If the FI has the obligation to pay interest on all of the amount of
short-term debt as commissioned by the government (and thus also the equiv-
alent short-term saving deposit held by the representative agent), but retains
some share of this short-term bond as collateral for credit production whose
value (i.e. collateral time the net CCAPM return) is re-distributed as a div-
idend payment, how is it going to fulfil this obligation? It can only do so by
paying out the revenue from credit production instead (which is price times
quantity, i.e. the net nominal CCAPM rate times the amount of credit equal to
the retained debt-share as collateral, or it−1ft = it−1s
b
t
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
), whose amount
exactly equals that share of short-term government debt which is retained as
collateral. However, part of this revenue is paid out directly as the banking
wage bill, which upon normalising by ft = s
b
t
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
to convert it into a return,
equals the average product of banking labour time 17 :
ρ
(
µt
λt
)
= ρit−1 =
wtnf,t
sbt
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
(26)
Thus implying a proportional banking time cost defined over the entire supply
of short term debt given by 18 :
sbtρ
(
µt
λt
)
= sbtρit−1 =
wtnf,t
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
(27)
Since the return on the retained share of short-term debt (and the equiva-
lent share of the short-term saving deposit) is partially paid out in terms of
the average product of banking labour time, it follows that the residual vis-
ible earned rate of return on the short-term saving deposit itself, net of that
banking labour cost, has to be lower and, given a fixed deposit-proportional
supply of short-term nominal debt η¯ = b1,t−1
(1+πt)
/dt, that endogenous variation
in the share of credit used in purchasing consumption f ∗t = ft/dt affecting s
b
t ,
17 To better understand the validity of this expression, recall that ft = s
b
t
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
.
Therefore the above can also be written as it−1ρft = wtnf,t which results from
Cobb-Douglas specification of credit production.
18 Notice that in my derivations I typically abstract from including the stationary
growth rate κ and assume that all growing variables have already been normalised
by κ and thus converted to stationary equivalents.
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will cause variations in this cost distortion. The FI’s balance sheet solvency
restriction that assets equal liabilities is given by:
Ptft +Mt = Ptdt (28)
The balance sheet liquidity constraint is that money withdrawn by the con-
sumer is covered by deposits:
Ptdt ≥M
h
t (29)
which would hold with strict equality if no credit were produced. The FI’s
objective is to maximise it’s discounted stream of current and future profits:
max
nf,t
E0
∞∑
k=0
βλt+k
λt
{
pft+kft+k − wt+knf,t+k
+ (1 + i1,t+k−1)
(
1− sbt+k
) b1,t+k−1
(1 + πt+k)
+
n∑
j=2
1 + ij,t+k−1
(1 + ij−1,t+k) (1 + πt+k)
bj,t+k−1
− b1,t+k −
n∑
j=2
bj,t+k + Ω
c
t+kit+k−1 − Π
f
t+k
−
1 + i˜1,t+k−1
(1 + πt+k)
ds1,t+k−1 −
n∑
j=2
1 + i˜j,t+k−1(
1 + i˜j−1,t+k
)
(1 + πt+k)
dsj,t+k−1
+ ds1,t+k +
n∑
j=2
dsj,t+k
+
mt+k−1
(1 + πt+k)
−mt+k
−
dct+k−1
(1 + πt+k)
+ dct+k
}
(30)
Notice therefore that the earnings on the retained share of debt as collateral
equal in amount to credit are given by:
(
µt
λt
)
ft = it−1ft = s
b
t
b1,t−1
(1 + πt)
it−1 ≡ Ωtit−1 = Π
f
t (31)
The return on the share of debt which is retained is then simply replaced by
the revenue from credit production, which upon normalising by that share of
debt (or alternatively by credit, since they are the same in amount), results in
a partitioned payout in form of the banking wage bill and a residually visibly
lower return on that share of the short-term saving deposits, i.e.:
MPnf,t × nf,t
ft
=
wtnf,t
ft
=
wtnf,t
sb1,t−1
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
= pft ρ = it−1ρ (32)
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where MPnf,t is the marginal product of banking labour which upon multi-
plication with the amount of banking labour, represents the return in form of
the banking wage bill and
MPd,t × dt
ft
=
MPd,t × dt
sb1,t−1
b1,t−1
(1+πt)
= pft (1− ρ) = it−1 (1− ρ) (33)
represents the residual payout on the short-term saving deposit, which re-
lates to the revenue creation from deposits in credit production. MPd,t is the
marginal product of deposits in credit production and MPd,t × dt therefore
the total revenue share of credit production due to deposits. This makes clear
how the share of the short-term saving deposit thus commands a return which
equals the net nominal CCAPM rate (or the price of credit) minus the average
cost paid out in form of the banking wage bill. Therefore, the model predicts
a money market rate paid out to the representative household’s short-term
saving deposit which equals the usual CCAPM pure intertemporal rate, mi-
nus the salary the household takes home from his activity as a banker, whose
business it is to produce an exchange credit service evading the exchange cost.
2.3 The household
The representative household derives utility in standard fashion from a mo-
mentary utility function in consumption and leisure:
Ut = U (ct, lt) (34)
where later on, I typically may want to consider a specific parametrisation
which is additively separable and logarithmic in both consumption and leisure.
An important reason for doing so is to emphasise that significant asset price
distortions can be obtained as in Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and Canzoneri
et al. (2008) in terms of ”first-order” market-driven effects instead of the
usual ”second-order” risk-induced arguments which typically rest on assump-
tion of high risk aversion and/or non-standard utility function specifications.
Throughout the paper I will therefore assume the following specification for
utility:
Ut = log ct +Ψ log lt (35)
The household’s only non-financial endowment is labour time, which she can
supply to both the goods producing firm producing the consumption good and
the financial intermediary producing exchange credit, or partially use up by
taking leisure. This endowment is normalised to one and therefore translates
into the following constraint:
1− lt = ng,t + nf,t (36)
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where nf,t is the amount of time spend in producing the credit exchange ser-
vice and ng,t is the amount of time spend working in the goods-producing
sector, both of which are remunerated by paying the household the equilib-
rium wage rate. Deciding on the optimal level of consumption, the household
needs to obey an exchange condition in form of a cash-in-advance constraint,
which is modified to allow not only money balances to provide the required
liquidity services, but also a costly credit exchange service. The total amount
of nominal liquidity translates into an equivalent nominal value of deposits
held with the FI. Expenditure will be sourced from the total deposits, either
by withdrawal of the household’s cash balances from an ATM machine, which
are in turn connected to corresponding current accounts, given by Dct or resid-
ually by using costly credit exchange services, where the money (or, residually,
credit) velocity measures will crucially also depend on the price of credit. The
exchange constraint is thus given by:
Ptdt ≡ D
c
t + Ptft ≥ Ptct (37)
or, by dividing through by the current price level, defining dct = D
c
t/Pt and
with a positive CCAPM nominal rate resulting strict equality we have:
dt ≡ d
c
t + ft = ct (38)
Using the definition of the per unit of deposits credit production function, f ∗t ,
which is the inverse of credit-deposit velocity (or alternatively, the inverse of
credit-consumption velocity), enables me to re-write the exchange constraint
in implied money demand form, as a function of the inverse of deposit-credit
velocity and total deposits (being identically equal to consumption):
dct = (1− f
∗
t ) dt ≡ (1− f
∗
t ) ct (39)
On choosing the optimal level of consumption, the household creates (real-
valued) deposits with a financial intermediary, which are then taken as a given
input factor to producing credit.
dt ≡ ct (40)
Finally, as the credit exchange service is produced by a decentralised finan-
cial intermediary, the price of this credit service is explicitly spelled out (see
Gillman and Kejak, 2008), and in a unique no-arbitrage exchange equilibrium
between money and credit, has to be equal to the cost of using money in
carrying out transactions, which is the usual CCAPM net nominal market in-
terest rate, as defined in Canzoneri and Diba (2005). The household’s budget
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constraint is thus given by:
wt (ng,t + nf,t) + Π
f
t +
dct−1
(1 + πt)
+
(1 + i1,t−1)
(1 + πt)
b∗1,t−1 +
n∑
j=2
1 + ij,t−1
(1 + ij−1,t) (1 + πt)
b∗j,t−1
+
(
1 + i˜1,t−1
)
(1 + πt)
ds1,t−1 +
n∑
j=2
1 + i˜j,t−1(
1 + i˜j−1,t
)
(1 + πt)
dsj,t−1
≥ct + p
f
t ft +
n∑
j=1
b∗1,t+j +
n∑
j=1
ds1,t+j (41)
where in particular, Ds1,t equals the amount of dollars held in a nominal short-
term debt (or saving) deposit with the financial intermediary (which the finan-
cial intermediary in turn backs up one-for-one by an equal amount of nominal
government bonds), earning the household the current period nominal risk-
free interest rate of 1 + i˜, which, as will be shown, is different from the usual
nominal CCAPM interest rate, 1 + it, due to the way short-term debt is par-
tially used as credit-backing collateral. Notice that dct = D
c
t/Pt represents the
corresponding level of the real-valued saving deposit. As in Canzoneri and
Diba (2005), I have included a virtual nominal bond, given by B∗1,t−1, in or-
der to aid the derivation of the standard CCAPM nominal return from the
household’s side 19 . As they do, I do not assume that such bonds are actually
held or traded by the household directly in this economy (although they will
be traded or held by the financial intermediary). As mentioned above, the
household needs to pay a price for using the credit exchange service in con-
junction with money balances, which is given by pft = µt/λt = it−1. Subject to
her budget and exchange constraint, the representative household maximises
her life-time utility over an infinite horizon by choosing an optimal recursive
policy function in order to maximise:
V (mt−1, st) = max
ct,mt
E0
{
U (ct, lt) + βV
′
(
mt, st+1
)}
(42)
where st is some vector of structural shocks, whose exogenously specified law
of motion will be specified further below.
2.4 The goods-producing sector
The discussion of the goods-producing firm is standard. The goods-producing
firm is maximising the present discounted value of current and future dividend
19 One may think of these virtual nominal bond holdings shadowing the equivalent
nominal government bond holdings of the financial intermediary.
21
streams, whereby it only has to optimally decide on labour demand. The
production technology of the firm is given by a standard CRS production
function, which is typically assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas specification (or
in absence of physical capital, just linear in labour):
yt = e
ztAgF (κt−1ng,t) = e
ztAgκt−1ng,t (43)
where Ag is some stationary total productivity factor and κt is the same
labour-augmenting exogenously specified technological progress specified in
credit production, governing the steady state trending growth path of the
economy. The firm’s objective is maximised using a discount factor equivalent
to that of the representative household and is given by:
max
ng,t
∞∑
k=0
βkλt+k
λt
{
yt+k − wt+kng,t+k
}
(44)
where λt is the current period multiplier on the household’s budget constraint.
Optimising with respect to goods labour leads to the usual (after de-trending)
condition of optimality equal to:
wt = e
ztAg (45)
2.5 Equilibrium, Government Financing constraint, Shocks
After netting out financial asset positions on the one hand, and the price of
credit times credit minus the re-distributed dividend payment on collateral
from the financial intermediary, on the other, we can write the social resource
constraint as follows:
ct = ng,twt = yt (46)
Also, as already discussed above, the government implements a steady state
growth rate of the money supply equal to Θ∗ which also contains a random
component. Further, the government is assumed not to engage in any Ponzi-
game regarding the management of it’s debt. The government financing con-
straint is given by:
Mt + Vt −Mt−1 = (1 + it−1)B1,t−1 − B1,t (47)
Notice that since the proportional amount of nominal debt is adjusted at the
beginning of the period such as to implement a constant real-valued debt-
to-consumption ratio η¯, the level of debt varies in state-dependent fashion,
and so do the debt interest payment obligations of the government. However,
given this circumstance, the government can always vary Vt independently in
state-dependent fashion such as to implement any desirable money growth
22
rate with some random component, given by Θt. All shocks behave according
to some log-normal autoregressive process of order one. The vector of shocks
is given by st = [zt, ut, vt]
′, where the shocks are goods productivity, money
growth rate and credit productivity, respectively, whose law of motion can be
summarised in VAR form as:
st+1 = Φst + ǫt+1 (48)
where Φ is a 3x3 matrix with the autocorrelation parameters specified along
the diagonal of Φ and ǫ ∼ (0,Ω).
3 Asset Pricing in the Credit-Banking Model
This section is going to describe how the distortive effects of the banking sec-
tor (embodied by the average cost in terms of the banking wage bill) will affect
asset pricing results in the model. The key intuition underlying the derived
asset pricing formulae (and in particular the low risk-free rate) is that the
usual return on a share of short-term debt equal to the banking sector’s debt-
utilisation rate (or collateral requirement relative to debt supply) is instead
paid out as a dividend. The household’s return on the equivalent share of it’s
short-term saving deposit is instead equal to (or replaced by) the price of credit
minus the average cost of producing credit, which is being paid out in form of
the banking wage bill. First, I am going to demonstrate how, using Bansal and
Coleman’s modeling technique, - they exogenously specify a nominal interest
rate target (see Coleman, 1996; Bansal and Coleman, 1996) - which allows for
simple closed-form derivations of stochastic asset pricing results, their and my
results regarding the risk-free rate and the equity premium are functionally
equivalent. Following this, I am going to follow Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and
show how using the usual modeling strategy applied to standard monetary gen-
eral equilibrium models (in which money supply is exogenously modelled and
the nominal rate endogenously determined), the banking sector’s distortive
effects creates a wedge between the CCAPM and the risk-free rate (as defined
by Canzoneri and Diba) and how this, through the usual expectations hypoth-
esis of the term structure of interest rates, produces an upward-sloping term
structure, which is steeper at the short-end.
3.1 A comparison with Bansal and Coleman
Bansal and Coleman’s theoretical as well as numerical results obtained from
simulations of their estimated model are based on a modelling technique, which
essentially amounts to holding fixed (or alternatively, exogenously specifying
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the law of motion of) the nominal rate of interest. In order to preserve a
convincing general equilibrium framework, they then proceed by assuming
that, given a fixed nominal interest rate target, the monetary authority en-
dogenously delivers a state-contingent money supply growth rate, such as to
produce an (expected) state-contingent inflation rate which is such as not to
be in violation with the usual Fisher equation derived from within the model.
Therefore in Bansal and Coleman, the nominal rate is exogenously, the real
rate in the usual way endogenously and the money supply also endogenously
determined such as to satisfy the Fisher equation 20 . This is in contrast with
dynamic treatments of monetary general equilibrium models such as stan-
dard cash-in-advance models described in textbooks such as Walsh (2003),
in which typically the real rate is endogenously determined from within the
model, the (expected) inflation rate is essentially driven by the exogenously
specified money supply growth rate and the nominal rate is also endogenously
obtained from the Fisher relationship between the real rate and expected infla-
tion. As will be clear, Bansal and Coleman’s modeling strategy regarding the
interplay between the real, nominal and inflation rate coupled with a simplified
assumption about the distribution of shocks allows closed-form solutions for
the risk-free rate and equity premium under uncertainty. Notice that Bansal
and Coleman introduce a role for money (as well as other means of exchange,
such as credit and checkable deposits) through an ad-hoc transaction cost
function, which extends the transaction cost literature (Baumol, 1952; Tobin,
1956; Barro, 1976; McCallum, 1983). They also show how their results (regard-
ing velocity), which are driven by the technology specification of this function
(and thus the marginal rate of transformation between cash and credit goods),
closely resemble results obtained from Stokey & Lucas’ cash-credit model, in
which results are instead driven by the preference specification of the utility
function over the cash and credit goods (and thus the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between cash and credit goods). Velocity and asset pricing results
in the model presented here are also technology-driven in the sense of being
dependent on the specification of the credit-production function and the re-
sulting stable money-credit equilibrium driven by the convex marginal cost
schedule. Bansal and Coleman’s key result regarding the risk-free rate stems
from equation (22) in their paper, which I reproduce here:
1− ξ2(pc) + ξ3(pc)
1− ξ2(pc)
u1(c)
1 + ξ1(pc)
[1− ξ2(pc)] q
=βEs
[
u1(c
′)
1 + ξ1(p′c′)
1− ξ2(p
′c′)
Π′
]
(49)
20 This technique was first employed in Coleman (1996) to theoretically explore
reverse causation from output to money, hence the necessity for a framework in
which money is endogenous.
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where the ξi are derivatives of the transaction cost function with respect to
different means of exchange. What is most important in this expression is the
term:
1− ξ2(pc) + ξ3(pc)
1− ξ2(pc)
(50)
which is smaller than one as long as bond-backed checkable deposits are used
in purchasing the consumption good, where ξ3(pc) < 0 is the marginal product
in the ”production” of transactions services due to bond-backed checkable de-
posits and pc is the consumption velocity of cash. Notice that, similar to Stokey
and Lucas’s cash-credit model (Stokey and Lucas, 1987), in which velocity is
determined by equating the nominal interest rate with the marginal rate of
subsitution derived from the preference specification of the cash and credit
goods, velocity in Bansal & Coleman’s model is also pinned down in current
and future periods, once the nominal rate of interest is assumed to be held
fixed at some target level. Using this modelling strategy and by assuming that
consumption growth ̺′ = c
′
c
is identically and independently distributed, that
the (gross) inflation rate is fixed at some state-contingent target Π¯ (implying
an expected inflation rate which does not violate the Fisher relationship), and
that utility is of CRRA type and given by U (c) = c
1−τ
1−τ
, Bansal and Coleman’s
equation (22) can be simplified to give:
1− ξ2(pc) + ξ3(pc)
1− ξ2(pc)
q =
β
Π¯
E
[
̺−τ
]
(51)
implying a real risk-free rate of interest equal to:
1
βE [̺−τ ]
1− ξ2(pc) + ξ3(pc)
1− ξ2(pc)
(52)
which, as long as short-term debt is providing liquidity service, embodied
by the term ξ3 < 0, implies a real risk-free rate which is lower than the
standard rate, given by 1/βE [̺−τ ]. Notice that the model presented in this
paper permits an equivalent representation of the risk-free rate, but instead of
relying on an argument based on the marginal product in (the production of)
transactions costs due to short-term debt (which backs up checkable deposits),
here it is the average cost paid out in form of the banking wage bill which
drives down the risk-free rate. Also, in contrast to Bansal and Coleman, in the
model presented, measures of relative supply of short-term debt (given by the
debt-to-deposits ratio η), and the credit demand-linked (and thus inflation-
dependent) debt utilisation rate sb1,t, which essentially represents the banking
sectors collateral demand backing up the produced credit service, matter. In
general therefore, for a fixed relative supply, inflation-induced increases in the
use of credit (and thus increases in money velocity as less money is used), lead
to an increase of the debt utilisation rate sb1,t, which will also affect asset price
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results. The derivation of the nominal risk free rate in the model is therefore
as follows:
1 + i˜t =Et
{
1 +
[
sb1,t+1 (1− ρ) +
(
1− sb1,t+1
)]
it
}
(53)
which shows that the one-period nominal risk-free rate consists of (an expecta-
tion over) an endogenously moving average, in which the share of short-term
debt (or the equivalent share of the short-term saving deposit) backing up
credit, given by sb1,t+1 commands a rate of return which is net of the average
cost paid out in terms of the banking wage bill 21 , whereas the residual share
of economy-wide debt, which does not serve as collateral, given by
(
1− sb1,t+1
)
commands the usual undistorted net nominal CCAPM rate. To simplify no-
tation, let me define:
Υat ≡ s
b
1,tρ
(
µt
λt
)
≡ sb1,tρp
f
t (54)
and
Υbt ≡
1
1 + sb1,tρ
(
µt
λt
) ≡ 1
1 + sb1,tρp
f
t
(55)
Notice then, since it = p
f
t is of the order of a (quarterly) net rate and that
0 < sb1,t < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1, thus making s
b
1,tρp
f
t of the order of a (quarterly)
net rate, it follows that, for some variable of the order of a gross (quarterly)
rate 1 + it:
(1 + it)−Υ
a
t ≈ (1 + it)Υ
b
t (56)
Using the above definitions, the gross nominal risk-free rate can thus be written
as:
1 + i˜t
= Et
{
1 +
(
1− ρsb1,t+1
)
it
}
= (1 + it)−Et
(
sb1,t+1ρp
f
t+1
)
= (1 + it)−Et
(
Υat+1
)
≈ (1 + it)Et
(
Υbt+1
)
(57)
21 To understand that this is an (expected) average cost, recall that in the model
Et (µt+1/λt+1) = it+1 = Et
(
pft+1
)
meaning that the net nominal CCAPM rate is
also equal to the expected price, and thus expected total average product, of credit.
26
Within Bansal and Coleman’s modeling framework, within which I wish to
place my results in order to allow for a direct comparison, both the nomi-
nal CCAPM and the inflation rate are assumed to be fixed state-contingent
targets, which in turn implies (using some further restrictions placed on the
model economy presented here, which I will discuss below) that current and
future Υa and Υb are fixed and thus known in advance. Following Bansal and
Coleman, I therefore get:
1 + i˜t =
=
1 + i
1 + ρsb1p
f
=
γ (1 + π¯)
β
Et
[
λt
λt+1
] [
1
1 + ρsb1p
f
]
=
γ (1 + π¯)
β
Et
[
λt
λt+1
] [
Υb
]
(58)
implying in particular a real risk-free rate given by:
γ
β
Et
[
λt
λt+1
] [
Υb
]
(59)
which after substituting out for the marginal utility of wealth in terms of
marginal utility and the usual cash-in-advance relative cost of consumption
(the gross nominal interest rate), gives:
γ
β
Et
[
(1 + i)Uc (c, l)
(1 + i′)Uc (c′, l′)
] [
Υb
]
(60)
If I now appeal to the same modeling strategy of Bansal & Coleman and
assume fixed nominal interest rate and inflation rate targets delivered by the
monetary authority, specify consumption growth ̺′ = ct+1
ct
to be identically
and independently distributed and utility to be of CRRA type in consumption
(and additively separable in consumption and leisure), such as:
U (c, l) =
c1−τt − 1
1− τ
+ A log (lt) (61)
the above formulae reduces to:
γ
β∗E [̺−τ ]
[
Υb
]
(62)
where β∗ = βγ1−τ is the growth-adjusted impatience factor (see Jermann,
1998). For an economy with no growth (as was assumed by Bansal and Cole-
man), the above reduces to:
1
βE [̺−τ ]
[
Υb
]
(63)
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where Υb < 1, which shows the functional equivalence between their and my
results for the low risk-free rate, when viewed from their modeling assumption.
Notice that in order to fully emulate an environment equivalent to Bansal
and Coleman’s (which is, in contrast to the model here, a simple exchange
economy), assuming a fixed nominal CCAPM rate of interest and fixed rate
of inflation is not quite sufficient, as this will not restrict the credit-banking
model enough to make next period’s debt utilisation rate sb1 (and therefore
next period’s value of Υb) known with perfect certainty. This share’s future
value will only be known with certainty, as long as future credit production is
known with certainty. Fixing the nominal CCAPM rate already accomplishes
fixing the price of credit, but two more conditions have to be imposed in order
to make next period’s level of credit production known with certainty. First,
it has to be assumed that there are no shocks to credit production (which
would shift the marginal cost schedule of credit production) and secondly,
that labour between the credit and goods sector is completely immobile. This
last requirement is necessary, since shocks to the goods production sector
alone would lead to labour movement between sectors in order to equate the
marginal products and thus the wage rate. As I have shown above, the debt
utilisation rate can also be equivalently expressed as a function of the credit-
banking cost (in terms of the banking wage bill) relative to the economy-wide
short term debt in the economy (which, relative to deposits or consumption is
always fixed). Therefore, the above additional restrictions essentially amount
to holding next period’s banking wage bill fixed, thus making next-period’s
debt-utilisation rate constant. Finally, to replicate Bansal and Coleman shock
distribution for the discount factor (which they use to illustrate their analytic
results, in numerical exercises shock processes are autoregressive of order one),
the productivity shock on the goods production function would have to be
identically and independently distributed.
Although the risk-free rate thus obtained is functionally equivalent to Bansal
& Coleman’s low risk-free rate, the intuition is of a different sort. Whereas
in Bansal & Coleman the term 1−ξ2(pc)+ξ3(pc)
1−ξ2(pc)
is responsible for driving down
the risk-free rate, which is directly related to the production specification of
the ad-hoc transaction cost function, in the model presented here it is the
partitioning (into the banking wage bill and residually the return on the sav-
ing deposit) of the payout received on the collateral share of short-term debt
which leads to a lower return. Notice that both here and in Bansal & Coleman,
variations in inflation, velocity and asset prices are linked together. Also, in
contrast to Stokey and Lucas (1987) whose velocity results depend on prefer-
ence specifications, both here and in Bansal & Coleman velocity results are
essentially technology-driven, with the difference that here the technology is
transparently modelled in terms of a micro-founded theory of financial inter-
mediation, whereas Bansal & Coleman’s specification is based on an ad-hoc
transaction cost function. Notice that the obtained ”reduced” risk-free rate
can exist in the absence of arbitrage, as the household is compensated in
28
return in form of the banking wage bill. The degree to which this banking
time cost can affect the risk-free rate depends on the relative production of
credit to deposits on the one hand, and the relative supply of debt to deposits,
which has been assumed to be a government target which is held fixed in each
period. As in Bansal and Coleman (1996), whenever such considerations of
proportional supply of debt matter, the standard fashion of modeling debt to
exist in net zero supply have to abandoned and replaced with some notion
of specific supply-modeling. Notice also that in the model presented here, the
banking wage bill generated by credit production drives down the return on
the short-term saving deposit. This production function was given by:
ft = e
vtAf (κt−1nf,t)
ρ c1−ρt where ct ≡ dt (64)
Bansal & Coleman’s specification of their transactions cost function, which
may be thought of as the transactions cost literature’s exchange cost analogue
to the exchange cost (given by the net nominal interest rate) in the cash-in-
advance literature, is given by:
Ψ (c, c1, c2) = Ψ¯c
αl1−α where l = (cω1 + κc
ω
2 )
1/ω (65)
Comparing the two functions and noticing that c2 is the fraction of consump-
tion goods paid for with the bond-backed checkable deposits in Bansal & Cole-
man, this demonstrates the close analogy between their approach and the
approach taken here. In their specification, bond holdings also yield a trans-
actions service return in terms of marginally adding to the total value of such
transaction services, which could equivalently expressed in terms of labour
foregone 22 (which they hint at, by defining the transaction cost function in
that particular way, using l = (cω1 + κc
ω
2 )
1/ω). In contrast, in the model pre-
sented here, the transaction cost share due to the use of credit is equal to the
value of some share of beginning-of-period short-term bond holdings, whose
return paid out in terms of a dividend from it’s use as collateral, and instead
replaced by the total return of credit production, which is partitioned into
the banking wage bill and residually into the return on the short-term saving
deposit. Also, in contrast to Bansal & Coleman, here proportional supply and
the credit-induced banking sector’s demand of debt matter, as they define the
bond utilisation rate, sb1,t, whereas in their approach, the total value of the
bond issue is always equal to checkable deposits.
After demonstrating, within their specific modelling strategy, how the risk-free
rate is affected by the liquidity role of short-term debt, Bansal & Coleman pro-
ceed by including in standard fashion a risky asset into their model and show
22 On page 1140, Bansal & Coleman state that purchasing the consumption good
incurs a transaction cost in terms of foregone output or in terms of time devoted to
the production of consumption goods. In the credit-banking model, the credit share
of consumption is also the outcome of a productive process, involving labour.
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how the same term affecting the risk-free rate, 1−ξ2(pc)+ξ3(pc)
1−ξ2(pc)
, also affects the
equity premium and the non-parametric HJ bound (Hansen and Jagannathan,
1991). Because of the functional equivalence between their and my results, I
refer the reader to the straightforward derivation provided in their paper and
state for completeness the equity premium and the modified HJ bound 23 . As-
suming an identically and independently distributed growth rate of dividends
given by χ, the equity premium (defined as the ratio of the expected gross re-
turn to equities over the gross return to bonds) is thus modified to be defined
as follows:
E [γ−̺]E [χ]
E [γ−̺χ]
[
1 + ρsb1p
f
]
(66)
which depends in the usual way on the covariance of the growth in marginal
utility with the growth in dividends, but rises proportionately with the term[
1 + ρsb1p
f
]
. Therefore, the same term which lowers the risk-free, also raises
the equity premium. Similarly, Bansal & Coleman show how the HJ-bound
given by:
σ (k)
E (k)
≥
E (ζ)
σ (ζ)
(67)
where k is equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and ζ equals
any excess return, is easier to satisfy (for equity) once the liquidity-providing
role of the short-term bond is taken into account. In the model presented here,
the same argument can be made by taking into account how here the effect
of the banking wage bill distorts the risk-free rate. Analogously to Bansal &
Coleman, it can thus be shown that, with regard to equities, the HJ bound
imposes restrictions on the excess return according to:
ζ ′e = R
′
e −
[
1 + ρsb1p
f
]
(1 + i) (68)
Therefore, as long as credit is produced and the bond-utilisation rate sb1 is dif-
ferent from zero, the average excess return E (R′e) is smaller than the observed
equity premium, given by R′e − (1 + i), by an amount related to the average
cost in producing the debt-backed credit service. This feature tends to lower
the Sharpe ratio on ζ ′e and therefore makes it easier for the above bound to
be satisfied.
23 Another reason for placing less emphasis on this derivation is the suspicion that
B&C’s derivation of the high equity premium is an artifact of their peculiar modeling
assumption based on reverse causation and endogenous money.
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3.2 Stochastic and Steady State Asset Price Analysis
This section is going to explore the implications for stochastic as well as steady
state asset pricing results in the credit-banking model. Notice that from here
on onwards, I will take the dynamics of the model to be based on the usual
interpretation of the Fisher relationship, and not the one employed by Bansal
and Coleman (1996) which was motivated by a study of reverse causation from
output to money. Also, for the discussion of stochastic asset pricing results,
it will be convenient to re-state the problem first in terms of prices and then
to use continuous time formulae to convert back to net returns 24 . Further,
notice that for a given ex-post realised rate of inflation, the cost-term driving
down the nominal risk-free rate would also imply a reduction in the short-term
real rate by the same amount. Therefore, in order to abstract from inflation
and reduce cluttering of my analytical results with products or sums of log
inflation rates, I will only consider shadow prices (and returns) of inflation-
indexed bonds, also aiding comparison with previous results from the literature
focusing on asset pricing results of real bonds. Of course, having said that, it
is important to highlight the fact that no matter whether one considers real or
nominal rates of return, the credit-banking related cost-wedge in form of the
proportional banking wage bill over total short-term debt is always a function
of the net nominal CCAPM rate, as the price of credit equals the opportunity
cost of money holding money.
3.2.1 The low risk-free rate
The low nominal risk-free rate obtained above implies for a short-term inflation-
indexed bond’s real return, or the equivalent inflation-indexed short-term sav-
ing deposit’s return:
1 + r˜1,t = (1 + r1,t)Et
(
Υbt+1
)
=
γ
β
Etλt+1
λt
[
Et
(
Υbt+1
)]
(69)
The above return derivation of the low real risk-free rate, implies the following
for the price of the same financial asset:
p˜b1,t = (1 + r˜1,t)
−1 =
β
γ
λt
Etλt+1
[
Et
(
Υbt+1
)]
−1
(70)
Defining Λt+1 =
λt
Etλt
= ct+1(1+it)
ct(1+it−1)
and assuming this variable to be log-normally
distributed (which it would be, if consumption and nominal interest rates are
log-normal, an assumption also used by Bohn (1991)), then using continuous
24 This technique is also used by den Haan (1995). Cochrane (2005, p. 15) emphasises
the interchangeability of price-based and return-based asset price derivations.
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time formulae as in den Haan (1995) implies:
r˜1,t = − ln
(
p˜b1,t
)
=
[
− ln β∗ + ln
(
EtΥ
b
t+1
)]
− ln [EtΛt+1]−
1
2
V ar [ln (Λt+1)]
=
[
− ln β∗ − EtΥ
a
t+1
]
− ln [EtΛt+1]−
1
2
V ar [ln (Λt+1)]
=
[
r¯ − EtΥ
a
t+1
]
− ln [EtΛt+1]−
1
2
V ar [ln (Λt+1)] (71)
where ln β∗ = ln
(
β
γ
)
. Upon substituting out for the marginal value of wealth,
the above expression can be written as:
r˜1,t =
[
r¯ −EtΥ
a
t+1
]
+ [Et∆ct+1 +∆it]
−
1
2
V ar (Et∆ct+1)−
1
2
V ar (∆it)− Cov (Et∆ct+1,∆it) (72)
This expressions is equal to the conditional value of the risk-free rate as implied
by conditional variations in the stochastic discount factor. Observing that
the model’s first-order conditions have been divided through by κt−1 such
as to make all variables stationary, taking unconditional expectations implies
E∞∆ct+1 = 0 and E∞∆it = 0, and the unconditional value of the same
expression is equivalent to:
E∞r˜1,t =
[
r¯ − E∞Υ
a
t+1
]
−
1
2
V ar [ln (Λt+1)] (73)
The above conditional and unconditional expressions for the risk-free rate
generalise standard derivations of the this rate in barter economies along two
dimensions. First of all, since exchange-in-advance (in form of either credit
or money) translates into the usual exchange cost of the net CCAPM nomi-
nal rate of interest, the stochastic discount factor given by the marginal rate
of substitution in consumption reflects this cost in marginal utilities of con-
sumption in the current and next period. This of course then means that upon
expansion of the expectation of the log-normally distributed SDF, the variance
of the net CCAPM interest rate and it’s covariance with consumption growth
matter as well (see Bohn, 1991). The intuition for the negative effect of the
volatility of the SDF on the unconditional return of a risk-free bond is well
known and relates the the increased demand for savings today when valuation
of tomorrow’s state is relatively volatile (see Jermann, 1998). Secondly, and
more importantly, there is a ”first-order” market-driven cost effect in form of
the partitioning of the effective return of the bond into the residually lower
return on the short-term saving deposit, given by r˜b1,t and the banking wage
bill. This effect is embodied by the conditional expectation term:
EtΥ
a
t+1 = Et
(
sbt+1ρp
f
t+1
)
= Et
(
sbt+1ρit
)
=
wt+1nf,t+1
b1,t/Et (1 + πt+1)
(74)
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which is subtracted from the pure deterministic rate given by r¯ = − log (β∗).
Credit-banking asset price distortions do not produce ”second-order” risk-
induced effects in form of covariances embodying systematic risk. The intuition
for this is that although the investor does not know ex-ante how much of
his payout on the short-term saving deposit will be subtracted and paid out
instead in form of his wage bill he receives in his activity as a banker, the
variation of the low-risk free rate due to that effect is perfectly hedged by
construction. All that is required to establish the valuation of the deterministic
part of his short-term saving deposit’s return, is to subtract the expected
payout in form of the expected proportional cost given by the future expected
banking wage bill (which is directly related to the future expected level of
credit production). Of course, ex-post this valuation may turn out to be wrong,
say, because of an unexpectedly large level of credit production (implying
a higher banking wage bill and an ex-post lower return on the short-term
saving deposit), but such unexpected outcomes and the resulting unexpected
variation in the deterministic return component of the risk-free rate is perfectly
offset by compensating unexpected variations in the ex-post realised banking
wage bill. Finally, in line with Canzoneri and Diba (2005), the model still
allows the definition of the purely intertemporal rate affecting the consumption
Euler equation, which is defined in the usual way as:
r1,t = r¯ + [Et∆ct+1 +∆it]−
1
2
V ar [ln (Λt+1)] (75)
with an unconditional mean of:
E∞r1,t = r¯ −
1
2
V ar [ln (Λt+1)] (76)
Of course, the only element distinguishing this intertemporal rate from it’s low-
risk free return counterpart which the representative household earns on the
short-term saving deposit is the cost-distortion term due to credit production.
Notice that we could also think of a risky asset (equity) whose valuation would
depend on the uncertain flow of future dividend payments. In the credit-
banking model presented here, this dividend could be endogenously deter-
mined as the the firm’s revenue minus it’s wage bill, i.e. divt = e
ztyt−wtng,t
25
or proxied by simply setting it equal to consumption, divt = ct. Since utility
is assumed to be logarithmic and additively separable, it is then a well-known
fact that the price of this risky asset, given by peqt , is proportional to the
current dividend payout in the following way:
peqt =
β
1− β
divt (77)
25 This would cause the dividend to be equal to the productivity innovation in the
goods sector (see Rouwenhorst, 1995; Jermann, 1998).
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Defining the gross real return of this risky asset in the usual way as as the
expected future price and dividend payment divided by the current purchase
price:
reqt =
Et (p
eq
t+1 + divt+1)
peqt
(78)
the model would then also produce a condition of optimality for this asset in
the usual way as:
1 = Et
[
γ
β
Λt+1r
eq
t
]
(79)
which leads to the well-known derivation of an excess return of the risky asset
over the purely intertemporal CCAPM rate given by:
reqt − r1,t = −
Cov (Λt+1, r
eq
t )
EtΛt+1
(80)
This means that the conditional excess return of the risky asset over the low
risk-free rate on the short-term saving deposit is therefore given by 26 :
reqt − r˜1,t = EtΥ
a
t+1 −
Cov (Λt+1, r
eq
t )
EtΛt+1
(81)
This result shows how the equity premium in the credit-banking model defined
as the excess return of the risky asset over the cost-distorted risk-free rate
obtained on the short-term saving deposit is given in the usual way by the
risk-adjustment due to systematic risk of receiving a low dividend in times
of already low consumption plus the expected payout in form of the future
expected banking wage bill. The latter factor will crucially depend on the
expectation of future credit production and the future expected price of credit,
pft+1 = µt+1/λt+1.Given the stochastic specification of the low risk-free rate
and the excess return of a risky asset over this rate, the steady state real risk-
free rate ignores risk-induced adjustments between the risky and the purely
26 The covariance between stock returns and some measure of the marginal value of
wealth, like consumption, is negative. Consumption typically rise (lowering marginal
valuation) when stock markets rise. Therefore −Cov (Λt+1, r
eq
t ) > 0
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intertemporal rate and is thus given by:
1 + r˜ =
γ
β
[
1
1 + sbρpf
]
=
γ
β
Υb
=
γ
β
−Υa
=
γ
β
− sbρpf (82)
which is different from the usual steady state real rate in standard models
given by γ/β, and as long as credit production is positive, lower than the
standard rate, due to average cost incurred from producing the debt-backed
credit. Therefore, the ratio of the real CCAPM over the real risk-free rate (and
thus the steady state equity premium) is given by:
1 + r
1 + r˜
= 1 + ρsbpf (83)
or
r − r˜ = ρsbpf =
wtnf
b1/ (1 + π)
(84)
which again demonstrates the simple intuition that the wedge driven between
the real risk-free and the real CCAPM rates is related to the proportional
banking time cost in terms of the banking wage bill over the total amount of
short-term debt.
3.2.2 The Term Structure of Interest Rates
Restating the representative household’s choice of (inflation-indexed) bonds
(and undistorted virtual bonds) in her budget constraint in terms of prices
rather than returns, i.e.
. . .+ ds1,t−1 +
n∑
j=2
p˜bj−1,td
s
j,t−1 −
n∑
j=1
p˜bj,td
s
j,t . . .
. . .+ b∗1,t−1 +
n∑
j=2
pbj−1,tb
∗
j,t−1 −
n∑
j=1
pbj,tb
∗
j,t . . . (85)
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Then, the first-order conditions for subsequent inflation-indexed bonds imply
the following formula for the price of the j-th period inflation-indexed bond:
p˜bj,t =
(
β
γ
)j [
Etλt+j
λt
] [
EtΥ
b
t+j
]
−1
=
(
β
γ
)j−1 [
β
γ
(
EtΥ
b
t+j
)
−1
] [
Etλt+j
λt
]
(86)
The above expression thus shows how the cost-distortion in form of the bank-
ing wage bill only affects the expected tail-end one-period return of any j-
period bond. For bonds with shorter maturity, the distortion will have a dis-
proportionately larger effect on the average yield than for bonds with very
high maturity. This argument clearly explains the intuition behind the con-
vexity of the term structure in the credit-banking model. Using the same logic
as for the one-period real risk-free rate, taking the negative log of the above
price for a j-th period bond, the expression can can be written in terms of the
net holding period return for a j-th period bond:
r˜j,t = (j − 1) r¯ +
(
r¯ − EtΥ
a
t+j
)
+ [Et∆ct+j + Et∆it+j−1]−
1
2
V ar
[
ln
(
λt
Etλt+j
)]
(87)
by dividing through by j we can find the average yield of a j-period bond:
ˆ˜rj,t =
(
j − 1
j
)
r¯ +
(
1
j
)(
r¯ − EtΥ
a
t+j
)
+
[Et∆ct+j + Et∆it+j−1]−
1
2
V ar
[
ln
(
λt
Etλt+j
)]
j
(88)
The above expression for the conditional yield of inflation-indexed bonds of
various maturity embeds the derivation of the low risk-free rate by setting
j = 1. Also, the unconditional or average yield is given by:
E∞ ˆ˜rj,t =
(
j − 1
j
)
r¯ +
(
1
j
)(
r¯ − E∞Υ
a
t+j
)
−
1
2
V ar
[
ln
(
λt
Etλt+j
)]
j
(89)
Notice that the analogous virtual term structure related to the undistorted
fictitious bonds again ignores the distortive cost term and it’s implied condi-
tional yield expression is therefore given by:
rˆj,t = r¯ +
[Et∆ct+j + Et∆it+j ]−
1
2
V ar
[
ln
(
λt
Etλt+j
)]
j
(90)
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and it’s unconditional or average yield expression by:
E∞rˆj,t = r¯ −
1
2
V ar
[
ln
(
λt
Etλt+j
)]
j
(91)
What is important here is that the cost-distorted lower return of the tail end on
any j-period bond has a disproportionately larger effect on bonds with smaller
maturity than bonds for which j is very large. Indeed for a bond for which
j → ∞, the effect of the reduced tail-end return asymptotically disappears,
meaning that the steady state average yield for the limiting bond is equal to
to the steady state real CCAPM rate:
(1 + rˆj)j→∞
= lim
j→∞


[
γ
β
] j−1
j
[
γ
β
− EtΥ
a
t+j
] 1
j


=
γ
β
(92)
Notice however the following drawback implied by this result. Calibrating the
CCAPM rate (by choosing a sufficiently low enough impatience factor) such
as to match it with the average return obtained on equity as observed in the
data, means that one automatically also pins down the average yield of the
long-term (limiting) bond to the same average return. However, in the data,
the real return on a short-term bond (i.e. the risk free money market rate) is
roughly equal to 1%, whereas the premium of a long-term bond above the risk-
free rate is typically only equal to 1% (thus earning an average yield of roughly
2%). Mehra and Prescott (2003) raise exactly the same concern, by concluding
that ”[Bansal & Coleman’s] model implies that there should be a significant
yield differential between T-bills and long term government bonds that pre-
sumably do not have a significant transaction service component”. However,
in Bansal & Coleman’s particular modeling framework, they clearly show how
this argument may not be valid, as roughly the same liquidity argument re-
sponsible for lowering the usual stochastic risk-free also simultaneously raises
the equity premium by proportionately more. But this argument may indeed
be an artifact of their particular modeling strategy, in which money supply is
endogenously determined. In steady state the above expressions regarding the
term structure can be simplified to give:
1 + rj =
(
γ
β
)j
(93)
which is the undistorted steady state holding period return for the virtual
term structure implying an undistorted per-period average yield which is just
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equal to the steady state real interest rate:
1 + rˆj = (1 + rj)
1/j =
γ
β
(94)
where 1+ rˆj represents the j-period real bond’s average yield. Including multi-
period saving deposits into the household’s budget constraint which are backed
up by corresponding multi-period government bonds and taking into account
the distortive effect of the banking sector on the short-term risk free rate,
implies the following steady state average yield on a j-period bond:
1 + rˆj =


[
γ
β
]j−1 [
γ
β
(
Υb
)]

1/j
(95)
where Υb < 1 for as long as credit is produced in the economy.
4 The Steady State
In the following section I am going to describe the steady state levels of endoge-
nous variables, that result after de-trending all growing variables by dividing
through by κt−1 and thus obtaining a non-trending stationary equilibrium.
The steady state can be summarised by the following set of equations:
1 + π = (1 + Θ) /γ (96)
1 + r =
γ
β
(97)
1 + i =
γ
β
(1 + π) (98)
pf =
(
µ
λ
)
= i (99)
f
c
= f ∗ = A
1
1−ρ
f
(
ρ
w
) ρ
1−ρ
i
ρ
1−ρ (100)
m
c
= m∗ = (1− f ∗) (101)
MRSc,l =
l
Ψc
=
1 + i
w
(102)
Ag = iρ
f
nf
= w (103)
1 + i˜ = 1 +
[(
1− sb1ρ
)
i
]
(104)
1 + r˜ =
1 + i˜
1 + π
(105)
sb1 =
f ∗
η¯
(106)
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First of all, equation (96) in the usual way sets the steady state rate of inflation
equal to the growth rate of the money supply adjusted for the exogenously
specified economy-wide economic growth rate. The steady state real CCAPM
rate is just equal to the inverse of the pure impatience factor, adjusted for
growth, which is given by equation (97). Then, given some calibrated val-
ues of the discount factor β and the exogenously specified growth rate of the
economy γ, using the Fisher equation (98), I residually obtain the standard
CCAPM nominal rate of interest. Equation (99) shows that the price of using
the credit exchange service in equilibrium has to be equal to the cost of other-
wise holding money, which is the net CCAPM interest rate. Given this price
of credit and the first-order conditions of optimality of the FI with respect
to labour, substituting the implied labour factor demand back into the credit
production function gives equation (100), which is the steady state value of
the inverse of credit-deposit (or credit-consumption) velocity. Residually from
this, the inverse of the money-consumption velocity is thus also defined and
given by equation (101). As shown by equation (102), the usual exchange cost
embodied by the (net) CCAPM nominal rate will thus affect the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure in the usual way. Turn-
ing attention to the productive sectors in the economy, perfectly mobile labour
between the two sectors results in a condition given by equation (103), which
just means that the marginal revenue products of labour in each sector have
to be equal to one common equilibrium wage rate. Equations (104), (105)
and (106) embody the key results of this paper and show how the nominal
(and inflation-adjusted real) risk-free rates paid out on the short-term saving
deposit held by the representative household are below the usual CCAPM
nominal (and real) rates, due to the average cost (or average product) in
collateral-backed credit production paid out in form of the banking wage bill,
which crucially depends on the debt utilisation rate sbt and the price of credit,
which in turn defines the proportional banking time cost over the total amount
of short-term debt available in the economy.
5 Calibration & Dynamic Analysis
In the following section, I am going to motivate and describe the baseline
calibration on which steady state and dynamic analyses obtained from the
solved model are based. As the mechanics underlying the de-centralised credit-
banking model presented here are very similar to Benk et al. (2005), in which
credit is directly produced by the household, similar steady state results are
obtained. However, reflecting the asset pricing approach taken in this paper,
the calibration to follow differs from standard treatments such as in Benk et al.
(2005) in the way the usual real steady state interest rate (which in this model
is equal to the real CCAPM rate) is chosen. Typically, standard calibration
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Table of benchmark calibrated Parameters
1 + r=1.03(1/4) real. CCAPM rate ρ =0.21 credit labour param.
f
c =0.25 credit-to-cons ratio Ag=1.0 TFP goods
γ =1.02(1/4) g. rate l =0.7 leisure
nf =0.0003 credit labour ng=0.2992 goods labour
Θ =1.05(1/4) × γ money g. φz=0.95 AR goods shock
φu =0.60 AR money g. shock φv=0.95 AR credit shock
ηy =0.40 debt-to-deposit ratio ǫz =0.65 s.d goods shock
ǫu =0.01 s.d. moneyg shock ǫv =0.75 s.d credit shock
Table 1
Baseline Calibration
exercises of models with zero growth set the impatience factor β = 0.99, thus
obtaining a quarterly real steady state risk-free rate equal to 1% (and thus
an annual of 4%). However, the risk-free rate in the model discussed here is
going to be below the usual CCAPM rate, where in particular the cost term
1
1+sbρpf
affecting the money market rate received on the short-term saving de-
posit is going to play a key role in this respect. Owing to this latter argument,
I calibrate the real CCAPM rate to be a somewhat lower annualised 3% 27
The steady state money supply growth rate is calibrated such as to imply
an annual inflation rate of 5%, the economy’s steady state exogenous growth
rate to equal 2%, implying an annualised nominal CCAPM rate of 8% and an
impatience factor β = 0.9975. The goods sector’s steady state total produc-
tivity term is set to Ag = 1.0 and leisure and total labour are in the usual
way calibrated to l = 0.7 and nf +ng = 0.3. Then I proceed in similar fashion
to Benk et al. (2005) and Gillman and Kejak (2005) and calibrate the degree of
diminishing returns in the credit sector ρ = 0.21, which is the U.S. time-series
estimate obtained for this parameter in Gillman and Otto (2005). Also, similar
to Benk et al. (2005), the steady state share of credit used in purchasing the
consumption good (i.e. the inverse of credit-consumption velocity) is fixed at
a value of f
c
= 0.25, which is somewhat lower than the chosen 0.3 by the afore-
mentioned authors. My choice is motivated by Canzoneri et al. (2007b), who
use a calibrated value for the debt-to-deposit ratio in U.S. banking institutions
(that is debt which is held by those institutions relative to deposits) equal to
25%. Assuming, as is the case in the model presented here, that the banking
sector’s holdings of debt is equal in value to the amount of credit produced
and that deposits are equal to the level of consumption, the calibrated value
27 Tallarini (2000) argues in the same way when calibrating the impatience factor
in his Epstein-Zin production general equilibrium model, where he also calibrates
β so as to imply a theoretical risk-free rate which is closer to the one observed in
the data.
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for f ∗ = f
d
= f
c
= 0.25 is obtained. Although Benk et al. (2005) base their cal-
ibration of the share of credit used in purchasing consumption on observable
long-run velocity of some monetary aggregate, my choice based on the level of
intra-bank debt reflecting the collateral requirement assumption of credit in
the model, roughly results in the same calibrated value and thus makes this
calibration more robust, as both perspectives yield roughly the same value.
The calibrated values residually imply a leisure utility preference parameter
Ψ = 2.29, and steady state banking time share of nf = 0.0003, which is within
close range of values obtained by Benk et al. (2005), who obtain a value of
0.00049. Also residually obtained then are a goods sector labour share equal
to ng = 0.2993 and a banking sector total productivity term Af = 1.05, where
the latter differs from Benk et al. (2005) obtained value of 1.422, which is
likely due to their inclusion of physical capital into their model, which is ab-
sent here, but also their higher calibrated value for f ∗. Based on the chosen
baseline calibration, figures (1) and (2) show the theoretical steady state aver-
age yield curve, which has been calculated based on the steady state formulae
provided in the preceding asset pricing section. The periods are in quarters
and the yields represent annualised values. The reduced one-period return,
due to the cost-distortion term 1
1+sb
1
ρpf
, is perpetuated throughout the entire
term structure, thus implying a decreasing effect on yields of higher maturity,
as only their tail-end one-period return is affected by this. Notice therefore,
Fig. 1. Theoretical Average Yield Curve (for ρ = 0.21)
how the two graphs show how the average yield structure also depends on the
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calibration of the degree of diminishing returns in credit production, ρ, but
also on the calibration of the amount (or supply) of short-term debt relative to
consumption (or in this model, deposits). Clearly, as figure (1) demonstrates,
increasing the amount of relative short-term debt available in the economy,
makes the distortive cost-effect of the banking sector matter relatively less
(since the steady state share of credit is calibrated at a fixed level of 0.25).
In contrast, increasing the degree of diminishing returns in the credit sector,
for a given price of credit, increases the banking wage bill and thus lowers the
residual payout received on the short-term saving deposit net of that cost.
Fig. 2. Theoretical Average Yield Curve (for η = 0.40)
5.1 Dynamic Analysis
In this section I am going to present a dynamic analysis of the model, based on
impulse response graphs as well as calculated contemporaneous correlations
obtained from simulations of the solved model. A competitive equilibrium for
this economy consists of a set of allocations {ct, lt, ng,t, nf,t, πt, fvt, mvt, kt,Mt}
∞
t=0,
a set of prices {wt, , icapt, rcapt, ibt, rbt}
∞
t=0, exogenous shock processes {zt, ut, vt},
money supply process and initial condition M−1 such that given the prices,
shocks and government transfers, the allocations solve the consumers util-
ity maximization problem, solve the firms profit maximisation problem and
the goods, labour and money markets clear. By log-linearizing the de-trended
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non-linear first-order conditions around the steady state I obtain a (singular)
linear rational expectations system of equations, where variables will typically
be in terms of log-deviations from steady state (but rates will remain in devia-
tions from levels) 28 . De-trending implies expressing all variables in stationary
form by first dividing nominal variables through by the price level Pt to ex-
press all variables in real terms and secondly by dividing through by κt−1, the
labour augmenting factor driving the exogenously specified growth rate in the
economy. Pre-determined endogenous and exogenous state variables are sum-
marised in the vector Xt = [zt,xt]
′ = [zˆt, uˆt, vˆt, mˆt]
′ and control variables simi-
larly summarised in the vectorYt = [cˆt, lˆt, nˆgt, nˆf t, wˆt, πˆt,
ˆicapt, ˆrcapt, iˆbt, rˆbt, fˆ vt, mˆvt]
′.
I proceed to solve for the first-order accurate solution of the policy function
using the Schur decomposition method to find the stable saddle-path of the
model (Klein, 2000). The resulting stationary recursive laws of motion are
expressible as:
Xt = PXt−1 (107)
Yt = FXt−1 (108)
which are used to produce impulse-responses to describe relevant effects and
also later on to simulate the model and analyse contemporaneous correlations
between variables. The solved system is thus given by:


zˆt
uˆt
vˆt
mˆt


=


0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00
1.04 −3.35 −1.97 0.00




zˆt−1
uˆt−1
vˆt−1
mˆt−1


(109)
28 I do not log-linearize explicitly, but actually symbolically differentiate the set of
first-order, market clearing conditions and exogenous laws of motion (which are all
modified to express variables in logs) w.r.t. to future and current states and controls
to obtain the Jacobian of the system, which I evaluate at the (log) steady state.
The Jacobian can then be split into matrices A containing partial derivatives w.r.t.
future controls and current states, and B containing partial derivatives w.r.t. current
controls and past pre-determined states, which can be solved for the recursive laws
using the Schur decomposition (see Klein and Gomme, 2008).
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and


cˆt
lˆt
nˆgt
nˆf t
wˆt
πˆt
ˆicapt
ˆrcapt
iˆbt
rˆbt
fˆ vt
mˆvt


=


0.994 −0.461 0.030 0.000
0.003 0.180 −0.012 0.000
−0.006 −0.461 0.038 0.000
0.353 40.69 −1.452 0.000
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−1.033 4.264 0.195 1.000
0.007 0.583 −0.035 0.000
−0.231 −3.350 −0.016 0.000
0.005 0.417 −0.027 0.000
−0.232 −0.181 0.010 0.000
0.133 −8.511 −0.678 0.000
−0.039 2.821 0.225 0.000




zˆt−1
uˆt−1
vˆt−1
mˆt−1


(110)
The above recursive laws of motion for the endogenous states and control
variables are used in the usual way to compute impulse-response graphs and
correlations between variables based on the simulated time-series obtained
from subjecting the model to goods sector productivity, money growth rate,
and credit productivity shocks.
5.2 Impulse Responses
In this section I am going to present the model’s behaviour in response to one-
off shocks, where I particularly wish to focus on monetary growth rate as well
as credit productivity shocks. The impulse responses obtained from money
supply growth innovations demonstrate how monetary policy shocks are ca-
pable of conditionally increasing the wedge between the nominal CCAPM and
nominal risk-free rates, given by:
Υbt =
1
1 + sbtρp
f
t
(111)
but only in as far as such shocks lead to higher expected inflation, thus raising
the nominal CCAPM rate and therefore also the price of credit. For money
shocks, this also leads to a rise in the share of credit, increasing the banking
wage bill overall, due to price and quantity effects. It is well-known from
standard cash-in-advance models (see Walsh, 2003), that the price effect (i.e.
primarily through changes in expected inflation) is only possible when the
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exogenous process for the money growth rate shock is modeled with some
degree of persistence. White noise money growth shocks, on the other hand,
would never change inflation expectations, but only lead to one-off variations
in the unexpected component of inflation (i.e. inflation forecast errors), leaving
inflation expectations unaltered.
Also, analysis of credit productivity innovations reveals that increases in the
share of credit alone do not necessarily lead to an increase of the wedge between
the nominal CCAPM and the nominal risk-free rates, since a fall in the price
of credit (through a fall in inflation expectations, thus lowering the nominal
CCAPM rate) may offset the quantity effect sufficiently enough in order to
lead to a conditional fall in the banking wage bill, closing the conditional gap
between the nominal CCAPM and the nominal risk-free rate. This case is
obtained for the one-off credit productivity innovation.
5.2.1 Monetary Shocks
Fig. 3. Response to 1 percent innovation in money growth
When shocked with 1% standard error innovation in the money supply growth
rate process, regarding the nominal CCAPM rate and consumption, the model
exhibits a behaviour which is equivalent to a standard cash-in-advance model
explained in standard textbook treatments, such as Walsh (2003). Increases in
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the money supply growth rate lead to an increase in (expected) inflation, thus
raising the nominal CCAPM rate through the Fisher relationship. This in-
creases the exchange cost of consumption in the usual inflation-tax way (Coo-
ley and Hansen, 1989), thus lowering the level of consumption and leading to
a substitution effect towards more leisure. Notice that, although not shown
here, although total labour residually has to fall, there is a shift of labour from
the goods to the credit sector, thus leading to decrease in goods labour and an
increase in banking labour. The top right hand quadrant in figure (3), shows
how the increase in the nominal CCAPM rate lowers credit-consumption ve-
locity (defined as c
f
) and residually increases money-consumption velocity. As
the money shock raises the ratio of the current period marginal utility of liq-
uidity services over the marginal utility of wealth, µt
λt
= pft , which also equals
the current-period price of credit, the convex upward-sloping marginal cost
schedule in credit-production thus implies a larger share of the consumption
good paid for in credit instead of cash, thus leading to a substitution in means
of exchange from money to credit. Using the (first-order approximated) in-
tertemporal Euler equation, one can see that a low current-period marginal
value λt of wealth coupled with a higher expected marginal value of wealth
Etλt+1, implies a low (or fall in the) real CCAPM interest rate
29 :
Et [r1,t + Et∆λt+1] ≈ 0⇔
Et [r1,t −∆ct+1 −∆it] ≈ 0 (112)
The bottom-right quadrant of figure (3) illustrates how a lower marginal val-
uation today vis-a-vis a higher expected marginal valuation in future periods,
through the dynamic Euler equation implies a modest fall in the real CCAPM
rate. Although following the shock, expected consumption growth is positive,
implying a fall in the real CCAPM rate, nominal interest rates are falling
making the term ∆it < 0. As the latter effect dominates the former, marginal
valuation turns out to be low today and expected to rise, thus leading to a
fall in the real rate. The bottom-left quadrant illustrates the response of re-
turn measures as well as the cost-distortion term 1
1+sb
1,t
ρpft
(called bcost in the
graph), responsible for driving a wedge between the nominal CCAPM and
nominal bond rate, thus for a given (expected) rate of inflation, residually im-
plying a lower real return on the bond-backed saving deposit. Notice that since
both the current and expected future price of credit is high and the current
and future share of credit (or inverse of credit-consumption velocity) is high as
well relative to steady state, following the money growth rate shock, this im-
plies a further fall in Υbt , leading to a further decrease of the real risk-free rate
paid out on the short-term saving deposit, thus dynamically increasing the eq-
uity premium (the gap between the real risk-free and the real CCAPM rates)
further beyond the steady-state wedge (recall that this wedge was defined as(
1 + i˜t
)
= (1 + it)Et
(
Υbt+1
)
). In particular, this means that the model implies
29 see Uhlig (1995)
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(holding other shocks fixed) that money supply increases (decreases) lead to
corresponding dynamic increases (decreases) of the deterministic component
of the equity premium, embodied by Υbt+1. Such a systematic conditional re-
lationship between the stance of monetary policy and the size of the equity
premium 30 has recently been established in a VAR analysis by Canzoneri
et al. (2007a). Whereas their analysis defines the behaviour of the equity pre-
mium as the conditional behaviour of the difference between a model-implied
CCAPM rate and the observed risk-free money market rate, the model pre-
sented here explains endogenous variation in this gap theoretically through
the distortive (cost-driven) behaviour of a micro-founded banking sector. In
summary, a money growth rate shock raises current and expected inflation,
translating into increases of the current and expected future price of credit.
This leads to an expansion of the credit sector, an increase in money velocity
and a residual fall in credit velocity, as the representative household reacts to
the increased inflation tax by using more credit instead of money balances,
which are now taxed more heavily. As both the price and the share of credit
rise, the proportional cost-driven distortive effect on the short-term saving
deposit rises, thus increasing the wedge between the nominal CCAPM and
the nominal bond rate, for given inflation expectations, implying a fall in the
ex-ante real risk-free rate. As consumption falls, more leisure is taken and
although total labour falls, banking time actually increases at the expense of
less time spent in the goods production sector.
5.3 Credit Shocks
Focusing first on the top-right hand quadrant of figure (4), which summarises
the responses to a 1% innovation in credit productivity, the responses of credit
and money velocity are qualitatively similar to those obtained from a money
growth rate shock. But whereas the shock to money growth increased the price
of credit, thus leading to a higher credit share that way, here increasing the
productivity of the credit sector lowers the marginal cost of producing credit
for any given level of credit (and for any given price of credit), thus leading
to a higher use of credit that way. Where the two figures differ, is shown in
the top-left hand quadrant, which shows how the nominal CCAPM rate (and
thus price of credit) falls, thus leading to a higher level of consumption and a
substitution effect away from labour towards leisure. Notice that, although the
bottom-right hand quadrant shows how the real CCAPM rises, the fall in the
nominal CCAPM rate is due to a fall in the expected rate of inflation, which
30 In their empirical analysis, they do not explicitly call this the equity premium,
but just an interest rate spread between the CCAPM and money market rate.
However, the idea of calling and calibrating this according to the equity premium
is entertained in Canzoneri and Diba (2005).
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Fig. 4. Response to 1 percent innovation in credit productivity
follows from an initially large spike in current inflation, due to the sharp fall
in the demand for money balances. This large spike in inflation after a credit
shock, followed by convergence from below it’s steady state value (implying a
fall in the expected rate of inflation), has also been documented by Benk et al.
(2005) in their analysis of a similar credit model. Notice that although leisure
increases and thus total labour has to fall residually, the labour spent in the
goods sector actually increases, whereas banking time falls. This movement
of labour from the banking to the goods sector is primarily due to the falling
relative price of credit. Recall that the labour market equilibrium condition
between the two sectors was given by:
wt = it−1ρ
ft
nf,t
=
yt
ng,t
(113)
Therefore, is the fall in the price of credit, given by the net nominal CCAPM
rate it−1 is stronger relative to the increase in credit production, then following
the shock, the marginal revenue product of labour in the credit sector falls
below the one in the goods sector. Therefore, labour will move from the former
to the latter sector until the marginal products are equalised at some common
wage rate. In spite of the fall in banking time, more credit relative to deposits
(consumption) can be produced, due to the boost in credit productivity alone.
Regarding return measures, the responses in the risk-free rate paid on the
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short-term saving deposit are quite different when compared to those obtained
from the money growth shock. Notice that although the share of credit used in
purchasing the consumption good has increased, typically implying a fall in the
term responsible for lowering the risk-free rate below the CCAPM rate, given
by Υbt =
1
1+sbtρp
f
t
, as the top-left hand quadrant shows, the term actually rises
(so it’s denominator must be falling). This is because the falling price (cost)
of credit, pft , more than outweighs the increase in the debt utilisation rate s
b
t
through higher credit production, thus leading to an effective increase in this
term. This means that following a credit shock, the conditional gap between
the CCAPM and risk-free rate paid on the short-term saving deposit actually
falls. In summary, a positive shock to credit productivity increases the share of
credit, but also lowers the price of credit through the falling nominal CCAPM
rate. Due to the falling exchange cost, consumption rises and less leisure is
taken. The negative price effect of credit is strong enough to induce a shift
of labour from the credit to the goods sector, implying a fall in banking time
and an increase in goods production labour. Also, regarding the conditional
determination of return measures, the same price effect is strong enough to
outweigh the velocity effect on the distortionary cost term, thus for a given
expected inflation rate, leading to a temporary increase in the real risk-free
rate, and a temporary fall in the steady state gap between the CCAPM and
the risk-free rate paid out on the saving deposit.
5.4 Goods Shocks
Following a 1% standard error to the goods sector productivity, the top left-
hand quadrant shows a modest increase in the nominal CCAPM rate as well as
a quantitatively similarly small substitution effect towards leisure (Consump-
tion therefore rises almost one-for-one with the rise in goods productivity, but
is omitted in the graph, in order to better illustrate the modest increases in
the other two variables). In spite of the increase in the nominal CCAPM rate,
leisure is taken such as to imply a fall in both goods and labour time. As
revealed by the top right-hand quadrant, the fall in banking labour time leads
to a fall of the share of credit used in consumption and a residual rise in the
money share, thus implying a corresponding increase in credit and decrease in
money velocity, respectively. The bottom left-hand quadrant illustrates how in
spite of the modest increase in the price of credit, the fall in credit production
is the dominant effect, implying a conditional rise of the distortionary cost
term above it’s steady state value, implying a conditional fall in the wedge
between the CCAPM and the risk-free rate. Also, a rise in the real CCAPM
rate again shows how marginal valuation is again dominated by the change
in the nominal CCAPM interest rate, changes in consumption appear to play
an insignificant role in this regard. What is not shown in the diagrams, is the
behaviour of the inflation rate, which behaves conversely to the credit shock
49
Fig. 5. Response to 1 percent innovation in goods productivity
case. Although credit increases, the increase in consumption also leads to a
higher demand for money balances in the period when the shock occurs, thus
implying an initial sharp fall in inflation to adjust the given pre-determined
money balances upwards. As consumption begins to fall again in subsequent
periods, inflation jumps above it’s steady state in the period after the shock
only to converge to it’s long-run level from above. In summary, a goods sector
productivity shock leads to a modest increase in the real and nominal CCAPM
rate, implying a modest increase in the price of credit. There is a modest sub-
stitution effect towards leisure, implying a modest fall in total labour, where
this time both banking time and goods production time fall. This leads to
less credit being produced and more money being held. The distortionary cost
term rises, thus leading to an fall in the gap between the CCAPM rate and
the risk free rate, conditionally reducing the equity premium.
5.5 Simulation Analysis
This section is going to analyse the simulated time series from the solved model
and, similar to Bansal and Coleman (1996), in particular focus on correlations
of velocity and ex-post asset returns with measures of monetary policy. In
order to make simulations comparable to historical post-war quarterly time
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series data, a simulation length of 200 was chosen, where each time series
is hp-filtered. Standard errors (where applicable) are generated by repeating
simulations 1000 times. The obtained correlations are then compared to equiv-
alent measures obtained from U.S. data, which have been taken from Bansal
and Coleman (1996). Table 1 shows the credit-banking model’s behaviour
Table 1: Velocity
Statistic Data Model
Velocity:
Average 1.20 1.33
Std. 0.11 0.021
Autocorrelation 0.97 0.56
Std. (-) 0.06
Correlation:
Velocity and Nom. Risk-Free Rate 0.74 0.97
Std. (-) 0.006
of consumption-money velocity. Based on the steady state calibration, the
model’s implied average value of velocity measure compare favourably with
the equivalent measure observed in U.S. data and represents an improvement
over standard cash-in-advance models which typically exhibit a velocity value
of unity. Also, in contrast to the credit-cash model by Stokey and Lucas (1987),
in which velocity measures different from unity and a positive relationship to
the nominal interest rate is obtained and whose approach is based on a simple
preference specification argument (in which cash and credit goods are imper-
fectly substitutable), velocity in the credit-banking model is primarily deter-
mined by variations in the price (equalling the net nominal rate) of credit
on the one hand, and the credit-productivity induced shifts in the convex
marginal cost schedule of the credit sector, on the other. Therefore, velocity
is not preference-, but instead technology-driven and credit is purchased in a
de-centralised market in which the intersection of the price of credit (which in
a unique exchange equilibrium between use of cash and credit has to equal the
opportunity cost of cash, the net nominal CCAPM rate it) and the upward-
sloping marginal cost curve determined by the degrees of diminishing return
parameter ρ, determine velocity.
The model does fairly well in capturing the autocorrelation of velocity as well
as the contemporaneous correlation with the nominal rate of interest. Notice
that in simulation results not reported here, the autocorrelation of velocity
is strongly linked to how persistently money supply growth rate shocks are
modeled. The model is less successful in capturing the observed volatility of
velocity, which is not surprising given the findings of Hodrick et al. (1991),
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who study the variability of velocity in a preference-based cash-credit model,
only to find that high levels of risk-aversion are needed, in order to make
interest rates more volatile, leading to sufficient variability in velocity that
way. The model presented here also exhibits low variability in the nominal
rate, due to low variability of the stochastic discount factor (or the real rate)
coupled with low variability in inflation expectations, which is common for
flex-price models, in which a large proportion of money supply growth innova-
tions directly translate into unexpected inflation forecast errors in the period
of the shock, leaving little left to be captured by inflation expectations. Notice
that, in spite of the credit-banking model’s second potential channel affecting
volatility - shocks to credit productivity - it appears that given the baseline
calibration, variability in the price of credit seems to matter far more for the
determination of the variability of velocity.
Table 2: Real Risk-Free Rate
Statistic Data Model
Ex-Post Real Rate:
Average 1.12% 1.95%
Std. 3.27 2.31
Correlation:
Ex-Post Real Rate and Inflation -0.68 -0.99
Std. (-) 0.001
Ex-Ante Real Rate and Exp. Inflation -0.34 -0.98
Std. (-) 0.001
Note:The ex-post risk-free rate is defined as 1 + i˜1,t − πt+1
Table 2 illustrates the model’s time series characteristics of the ex-post low
risk-free rate and compares this to historical equivalent measures from the U.S.
Through the credit-banking cost distortion, the low risk-free rate obtained on
short-term saving deposits can be calibrated such to to be much closer to the
historically observed low risk-free rate of approximately 1%. The model does
very well in capturing the observed standard deviation of the ex-post real
return on the short-term saving deposit. More importantly, there is a strong
negative correlation between this real rate and the realised rate of inflation.
But this results is hardly surprising, as the ex-post rate is constructed by
subtracting the ex-post realised rate of inflation from the ex-ante nominal risk-
free rate. Therefore, all of the inflation forecast errors (which are very large)
are contained in the ex-post rate, such as to produce a very high correlation
of this rate with the ex-post inflation rate (which contains the same inflation
forecast errors).
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What is more interesting however, is that the model is capable of producing a
strongly negative correlation between the ex-ante real rate and the ex-ante ex-
pected rate of inflation, which is also seen in U.S. data and has been found to
be robust through various studies (see Huizinga and Mishkin, 1984; Summers,
1984). The intuition for why this is the case is straightforward. As inflation
expectations rise, so does the current and future price of credit (through the
rise in the current and future expected nominal CCAPM rate which is largely
driven by inflation expectations), leading to a current and future expected
expansion of the credit sector. This however increases the future expected
proportional payout of the short-term saving deposit in form of the future
expected banking wage bill, leading to a residually lower real risk-free return.
Notice that although this implies an apparent unconditional as well as condi-
tional violation of the Fisher equation as measured by observable cost-distorted
money market returns and inflation, once the banking wage bill is taken into
account, the effective Fisher relationship is not violated unconditionally (natu-
rally, it will however never hold exactly ex-post conditionally, because of errors
in inflation expectations, but also never ex-ante unconditionally, because of
the inflation risk-premium).
Fig. 6. %∆ of Log Stochastic Discount Factor and Consumption
Figure (6) illustrates a representative simulation for the endogenously deter-
mined (from within the model) % change in consumption growth on the one
hand, and the % change in the log stochastic discount factor of the credit-
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banking model, on the other. Notice that the latter is given by:
log(Λt+1) = logEt
[
γ
β
λt+1
λt
]
(114)
which differs from the usual log discount factor of endowment barter economies,
which is just equal to the (expected) change in consumption, whereas here
marginal valuation also depends on the nominal CCAPM rate of interest. Fit-
ting an AR1 process to a representative simulation of consumption growth
results in an autocorrelation coefficient equal to −0.16 with a standard er-
ror of 0.45, making this measure close to i.i.d. The relevant log stochastic
discount factor for the economic environment discussed here has a positive
autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.62 with a standard error of 0.03. Re-
garding the stochastically implied average yield curve of the term structure
of interest rates, this implies a slightly downward-sloping yield curve due to
the cumulative effect of positive Jensen’s inequality terms (or variance terms),
which are subtracted from the deterministic mean return (see Backus et al.,
1989; den Haan, 1995; Cochrane, 2005). However, it is well-known that this
risk-adjustment of yield returns due to the hedging role of long-term bonds
when the representative household faces growing future volatility of valua-
tion decreases with ever less risk-averse representative agents, making this ef-
fect quantitatively very small for logarithmic specification of preferences (see
den Haan, 1995). In any case, the quantitative effect of the ”first-order” cost-
distortion leading to the downward-sloping convex-shaped of the deterministic
component of average yields will outweigh the previously mentioned ”second-
oder” risk-induced effect causing the yield curve to be slightly downward-
sloping, leading overall to a downward-sloping convex-shaped yield curve,
stochastically 31 .
Another feature of the credit-banking model which sets it somewhat apart
from standard cash-in-advance models is that inflation forecast errors, though
of course through rational expectations on average zero, will however gener-
ally be much larger on average. This is illustrated in figure (7). The reason for
this lies in the endogenous variation of velocity measures (through the endoge-
nous variation in credit production). Since money balances are pre-determined,
shocks leading to an imbalance between nominal money supply and money de-
mand, require an endogenous response in actual inflation in order to restore
monetary equilibrium in real terms. If, during the same time (say, following an
unexpected money growth shock), credit expands as well, then nominal pre-
determined money balances have to experience and even stronger adjustment
in real terms through inflation in order to establish an equilibrium between
31 Cochrane (2005, ch.19,p.361) shows how a log discount factor with autocorrelation
coefficient of ρ = 0.9 and a standard error of σǫ = 0.02 results in a downward-sloping
yield curve with a quantitatively very small slope, leading to an essentially flat yield
curve.
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Fig. 7. Ex-Ante Expected and Ex-Post Realised Inflation
the total supply of exchange means (i.e. money and credit) and money de-
mand, given by the current level of consumption. Therefore, adding credit
supply to a liquidity market (given by the cash-in-advance constraint) leads
to much stronger variation in actual inflation relative to expected inflation
than otherwise found in standard CIA models. Of course, additional shocks
to credit productivity further increase the uncertainty about future expected
inflation 32 .
Figure (8) illustrates how variations in monetary policy indicators affect the
cost-wedge between the nominal CCAPM and the nominal risk-free rate (and
thus the equity premium) over the business cycle and how the stance of mone-
tary policy is positively correlated with this wedge. The top left and right hand,
and the bottom right hand quadrant graphs are essentially all linked through
the stochastic money supply growth process and corresponding changes in
inflation expectations, also affecting the nominal CCAPM rate through the
Fisher relationship. The same positive relationship between the equity pre-
mium and actual inflation also holds, however with a less stronger associa-
tion for the reasons discussed above regarding larger inflation forecast errors.
The simulations confirm the results derived in the theoretical section and
clearly show the link between unexpected shocks to money growth, correspond
32 This point is also discussed in Gillman et al. (2007), section 3.5.2: Effects of
Shocks on Inflation.
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Fig. 8. Simulated conditional %∆ in equity premium (eqpt = i1,t − i˜1,t)
changes in the price of credit (via the CCAPM nominal rate) leading to varia-
tions in velocity measures driving the distortive cost distortion. In particular,
shocks to money growth are persistently modeled and thus lead to an increase
in inflation expectations, therefore increasing the price of credit which, ceteris
paribus, leads to an expansion of the credit sector. This in turn increases the
banking wage bill, primarily through higher banking time, but also through a
slight increase in the overall wage rate in general. The credit-banking model
therefore offers a new theoretical perspective on the positive association be-
tween the stance of monetary policy and the spread between the nominal
CCAPM and money market rate, as illustrated empirically by Canzoneri et al.
(2007a) and demonstrated theoretically by Canzoneri and Diba (2005). The
latter mentioned authors explain this systematic link through a falling ad-hoc
modelled bond liquidity premium as the issuing of bonds increases in an open-
market operation reducing the amount of money. The credit-banking model,
on the other hand, links increases in money growth, through their effect on
inflation expectations, to a rise in the price of credit and credit production,
thus resulting in a larger proportion of short-term debt’s return to be paid out
in form of the wage the representative household takes home in his activity as
a banker. The model therefore provides a micro-founded theoretical explana-
tion of this effect based on de-centralised credit production motivated by the
financial intermediation literature.
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6 Discussion
Before concluding, this section’s purpose is to briefly related the results ob-
tained from the credit-banking model to relevant themes of the existing liter-
ature. In particular, I will discuss how the distortive cost-effect due to credit
production (and directly related to the banking wage bill) driving a wedge
between the nominal CCAPM and nominal risk-free rate (and thus for given
inflation expectations, also between the relevant real rates), can also be in-
terpreted as a tax (or a subsidy, depending on whether one refers to returns
or prices of a bond). Secondly, the results relevancy regarding the failure of
Euler consumption equations will be discussed, and finally, a more detailed
discussion of the equity premium in the credit banking model will be provided.
6.1 The low risk-free rate: A banking time tax on the price of bonds?
Thus far the discussion of the low risk-free rate (or money market rate) has
been spelled out in terms of a partitioned payout on a short-term saving de-
posit, which was backed up one-for-one by an equivalent amount of short-term
government debt by the financial intermediary. The relevant result describing
this was given by:
(1 + r˜1,t)
= (1 + r1,t)− Et
[
Υat+1
]
≈ (1 + r1,t)Et
[
Υbt+1
]
(115)
where Et
[
Υbt+1
]
= Et
[
1/1 + sbt+1ρp
f
t+1
]
is the term responsible for driving
down the real risk-free rate. Therefore, writing the above results out in full,
it is clear that one could alternatively view this as a banking time distortion
of real CCAPM rate, thus resulting in the lower risk-free rate obtained on the
short-term saving deposit:
(1 + r˜1,t) = (1 + r1,t)Et
[
1
1 + sbt+1ρp
f
t+1
]
(116)
where the distortion is equal to the future expected proportional payout of
the return on the short-term bond in terms of the banking wage bill:
Et
[
1
1 + sbt+1ρp
f
t+1
]
≈ Et
[
−sbt+1ρp
f
t+1
]
=Et
[
−
it+1ρf
∗
t+1
η¯
]
= Et
[
−
wt+1nf,t+1
b1,t/ (1 + πt+1)
]
(117)
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Alternatively, the distortion of the CCAPM real return related to the future
banking wage bill can also be viewed as a tax on the price of the financial
asset commanding that return:
p˜b1,t =(1 + r˜1,t)
−1 = pb1,t
[
EtΥ
b
t+1
]
−1
pb1,tEt
(
1 + sbt+1ρp
f
t+1
)
(118)
Besides the usual Tobin effects which are often cited as one of the factors re-
sponsible for affecting the Fisher relationship, the banking time tax on short-
term debt implies a distortion of the Fisher equation implied by observable
money market rates and measures of expected inflation affecting this relation-
ship both in a steady state long-run, but also conditionally over the business
cycle. The credit-banking model discussed here makes this relationship cru-
cially depend on two factors: firstly, the price of credit embodied by the net
nominal CCAPM rate which typically also directly influences the level of pro-
duction of credit 33 , and secondly η¯ = [b1,t−1/ (1 + πt)] /ct the proportional
amount or supply of short-term debt circulating in the economy and how this
relates to the proportional amount of debt distorted, which is captured by the
proportional supply of credit f ∗t = ft/ct. Therefore, both the unconditional
average of sbt = f
∗
t /η¯ and it’s conditional behaviour over the business cycle are
crucial in understanding the degree to which the banking time tax can affect
the return (or price of) on short-term debt.
6.2 Euler Equation Rates and Money Market Rates
As pointed out by Canzoneri et al. (2007a), there exists a sizeable literature
documenting the empirical failure of consumption Euler equation regressions
based on the behaviour of aggregate consumption and observable money mar-
ket rates. This is problematic for models discussing optimal monetary policy
in a fashion implying equivalence of the observed nominal money market rate
and the CCAPM rate integral to the consumption Euler equation. Further
more, Canzoneri et al.’s empirical study suggests that there exists a systematic
link between the spread of the two rates and monetary policy, and how this fact
confirms certain central banker’s as well as academics unease about models of
monetary policy embodied by the new neoclassical synthesis in which the role
of money has been marginalised (and monetary policy is modeled by empirical
Taylor rules) and how financial intermediaries are not modeled at all. Figure
(9) clearly shows how changes in expected inflation (thus raising the nominal
33 Although, I have shown in the impulse response analysis, that a shock to credit
productivity can lead to a fall in the price and a rise in the quantity of credit,
where the former has outweighed the latter in it’s effect on the conditional equity
premium.
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Fig. 9. Simulated conditional %∆ in interest rate spreads (real and nominal)
CCAPM rate and therefore the price of credit) lead to a discrepancy (due to
the banking time tax implied by endogenous credit production) between the
observed nominal money market rate paid on short-term saving deposits and
the underlying purely intertemporal nominal CCAPM rate. The crucial point
is that it is the expected inflation rate channel, driven by persistence in the
money supply growth rate process, which influence the spread between the
two rates. Therefore, the conditional spread between the two rates can only
vary systematically with monetary policy in as far as the former is capable of
varying inflation expectations. The graph can be best understood by recalling
that an increase in the nominal CCAPM rate (and thus the price of credit)
causes and expansion of credit production and thus an endogenous increase in
the banking time tax levied on short-term deposits. This means that the nom-
inal market rate is “buffered” compared to the underlying nominal CCAPM
rate, it moves less in either way as the nominal CCAPM either falls or rises,
due to the banking time tax. As the top graph reveals, for a given inflation
expectation as implied by the Fisher relationship between the real and nom-
inal CCAPM rates, the ex-ante real rate on the short-term saving deposit
typically move more than the purely real intertemporal rate and sometimes
they even appear to be de-linked in their movements. Notice that, although
not pursued in this paper, this de-linked nature of the real money market and
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the real CCAPM rate and the uncertainty over it could even be increased by
modeling a government debt-to-deposit target which is only imperfectly met
each period, such as to make ηt = ρηηt−1 + ǫη,t an exogenous state variables
as well, incorporating expected and unexpected variation in the proportional
supply of debt as well.
6.3 The decline of the Equity Premium (Puzzle) ?
The credit-banking model creates an interest rate distortion (or differential)
between the T-bill rate and a limiting long-term bond of approximately 1.05%,
both in real and nominal terms and by doing so - through the expectations
theory of the term structure - propagates this distortion in a cross-sectional
fashion across bonds of various maturity and thus produces the convexly
shaped term structure of average yields seen in U.S. data. Similarly, for a
given growth-adjusted deterministic discount factor β, the model is thus ca-
pable of producing a theoretically low risk-free rate at 1.95% to be much closer
to the one observed in post-war U.S. data. The model-theoretic premium re-
turn on long-term bonds over T-bills (i.e. the money market or risk-free rate)
is also seen in the data to be approximately equal to 1.05%, but regarding
the high return on equity, the model is only capable in contributing towards
the resolution of this puzzle in as far as it has been successful in reducing
the low risk-free rate by that same 1.05%. The steady state calibration of the
model reflects a compromise between fitting unconditional returns of equity
and bonds. In particular, I have chosen to slightly over-estimate both the aver-
age real return on the T-bill rate (at 1.95% versus the roughly 1% seen in U.S.
data) and the average real return on a long-term bond (at approximately 3%
versus the roughly 2.3% seen in U.S. data). However, the theoretical spread
between short and long rates is correctly fitted. Notice therefore that in steady
state, the return of a long-term limiting bond quickly approaches the CCAPM
rate implied by the Euler equation, where the latter ought to be understood
as the model’s approximate counterpart of the return on equity. This implies
a steady state return on equity equal to 3%, and a steady state return on the
short-term saving deposit of 1.95% 34 . Based on early results of the equity pre-
mium literature, this may seem only a small contribution towards explaining
the return differential between risky and (cost-distorted) money market rates.
However, the current asset pricing literature appears more and more in favour
of a view claiming an initial over-estimate of this return differential and it is
not uncommon to encounter views which place the value of the equity pre-
mium to be as low as 2%−3%. One reason why the true population equity risk
premium as sampled from many different stock and bond exchanges may be
34 The quarterly spread is calculated as iρsb = 0.02× 0.21× (0.25/0.4) = 0.002625.
This implies an annual spread of 0.0105 or 1.05%
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lower, is due to survivorship bias implied by observable U.S. stock and bond re-
turns (see Brown et al., 1995). Also, some authors have argued that, given the
large historical fluctuations in stock returns and the relatively short amount of
data available, one may view the post-war experience as an unrepresentative
spell of luck (in terms of high equity returns vis-a-vis the risk-free rate) and
indeed, given the sample’s variability, an equity premium of 2% − 3% is still
within range of a 95% confidence interval 35 . Indeed, stronger than expected
economic growth and thus also dividend growth affecting stock returns may
explain the unusually high and unexpected equity risk-premium observed over
such a long period of time (see Cochrane, 2007, p.266). Therefore, contrary to
the view put forth in Kocherlakota (1996), the direction the current consensus
appears to take is to de-emphasise excessively high stock market returns of
the past. Indeed, in spite of recent downturns, recently observed stock mar-
ket prices well above historical levels, broader stock market participation and
the corresponding decline in the return on equity could be taken as evidence
supporting the view that much of the historically observed excess return of
equity over the risk-free rate was unexpectedly and unrepresentatively high.
However, calibrating the real CCAPM rate at values of 3%− 4% and viewing
this as the model’s approximate return on capital (i.e. the risky rate), still
leaves both the unconditional as well as systematic conditional variation of
the low risk-free rate to be explained. The model presented here puts forth
a theory of the risk-free or money market rate earned on short-term savings
deposits, which is based on the endogenous variation of a banking time tax.
35 Lettau et al. (2006) examine the role of a fall in macroeconomic risk leading to
the fall of the equity premium in the 1990s.
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7 Conclusion
The equity premium and the complementary risk-free rate puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1989), the related failure of theory-implied consumption
Euler equation regressions and the apparent inequality of observed money
market rates and theory-implied Euler consumption equation rates (Canzoneri
et al., 2007a), as well as the term premium puzzle (Backus et al., 1989), are all
indicative of a hole in our understanding of how such return measures ought
to be derived within a general equilibrium framework. A promising avenue
contributing towards filling this gap is to devise ways of modeling financial in-
termediation more explicitly (see McCallum and Goodfriend, 2007; Canzoneri
et al., 2008; Gillman and Kejak, 2008), thus opening up possibilities to distort
such return measures by better understanding what roles such financial inter-
mediaries may play and what implications for relevant measures might ensue
as a result.
Building on previous steady state analysis work conducted by Gillman and
Kejak (2008) and stochastic dynamic analysis by Benk et al. (2005), I have
described and solved a model of essentially cash-in-advance nature, which was
modified by incorporating a de-centralised credit-banking sector, serving the
dual role of conduit for liquidity in terms of money and a produced credit ex-
change service, and of being the sole point-of-sales outlet for saving deposits
of various maturity held by the representative household (which are inter-
nally backed up one-for-one by corresponding government bonds). The model
is capable of driving a cost-related wedge (in form of the banking wage bill)
between both the nominal and real CCAPM rates and the corresponding nom-
inal and real rates obtained on the short-term saving deposit, thus lowering
the deterministic component of the stochastic risk-free rate beyond the usual
(growth-adjusted) real rate defined by the inverse of the representative house-
hold’s impatience factor. The mechanism underlying the derivation of this
wedge is motivated by the distortive cost effects produced by a micro-founded
banking sector based on the theory of financial intermediation (Hancock, 1985;
Clark, 1984). In contrast to Bansal & Coleman, I show how the reduced short-
term money market rate is perpetuated through the term structure via the
expectations theory, thus leading to a convex upward-sloping term structure
with a much steeper slope at the short- than the long end, as only any j-period
bond’s tail-end return is affected by the banking sector’s cost distortion, im-
plied by the banking wage bill.
The key mechanism driving steady state, as well as dynamic results asset pric-
ing results, is that some share of economy-wide short-term debt equal in value
to the credit exchange service is retained as credit-backing collateral within
the banking sector and instead re-distributed in form of a dividend payment
back to the household at the end of the period. Instead, the representative
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household receives on this share of the short-term saving deposit the per unit-
of-credit normalised revenue generated by the deposits (or average product of
deposits, equal to (1− ρ) it), which equals the price of credit residual of the
average product (cost) paid out to banking labour in terms of the banking
wage bill. Since asset pricing results depend on the magnitude of the bond
utilisation rate sb1,t, relative supply and relative credit-production induced de-
mand of short-term debt matters. In as far as positive money supply growth
rate innovations can lead to an increase in the nominal CCAPM rate (primar-
ily by affecting the expected rate of inflation) and thus the price of credit,
the credit-banking model experiences an expansion of the credit sector and
thus a proportionately larger cost distortion in form of a banking time tax on
the return of the short-term saving deposit, as the bank’s debt-utilisation rate
rises. This leads to a conditional widening of the gap between the nominal
CCAPM and the nominal market rate. The paper therefore puts forth a new
perspective on the systematic link between the stance of monetary policy and
the spread between the money market and the CCAPM rate as implied by
the consumption Euler equation, as described empirically by Canzoneri et al.
(2007a) and explored theoretically by Canzoneri and Diba (2005). Finally,
the model is also capable of generating velocity above unity and a positive
correlation of this with the nominal rate of interest (both the intertemporal
nominal CCAPM and the nominal market rate), and a negative correlation
between the ex-post real rate and inflation, but more importantly, also a neg-
ative correlation between the ex-ante real rate and the ex-ante expected rate
of inflation.
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